The Life-Cycle Dynamics of Exporters and Multinational Firms by Gumpert, Anna et al.
The Life-Cycle Dynamics of Exporters and
Multinational Firms
Anna Gumpert (LMU Munich)
Andreas Moxnes (University of Oslo)
Natalia Ramondo (University of California at San Diego)
Felix Tintelnot (University of Chicago)
Discussion Paper No. 55
November 6, 2017
Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 | www.rationality-and-competition.de
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Spokesperson: Prof. Dr. Klaus M. Schmidt, University of Munich, 80539 Munich, Germany
+49 (89) 2180 3405 | info@rationality-and-competition.de
The Life-Cycle Dynamics of Exporters and
Multinational Firms∗
Anna Gumpert Andreas Moxnes Natalia Ramondo Felix Tintelnot
LMU Munich and CESifo U. of Oslo and CEPR UCSD and NBER U. of Chicago and NBER
November 2, 2017
Abstract
This paper studies the life-cycle dynamics of exporters and multinational enterprises
(MNEs). We present a dynamic model of trade and MNE activity in which the mode
of serving a market depends on the well-known proximity-concentration tradeoff. We
show that the option of performing MNE activities in the model produces life-cycle
patterns for exporters that differ from those in an export-only model. Calibrating our
model to rich firm-level data from France and Norway, our main quantitative finding
is that a reduction in trade costs triggers much larger responses in growth rates and
exit rates, for young exporters, in the model with MNEs than in the model without
MNEs. We also show that the model is largely consistent with a set of new facts on
the joint life-cycle dynamic behavior of exporters and MNEs.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of firms’ life-cycle dynamics has been crucial to understanding the effects
of economic shocks. While the life-cycle dynamics of exporters and domestic firms have
been extensively studied and documented, the behavior of multinational enterprises (hence-
forth, MNEs) over their life cycle has been relatively unexplored. Yet foreign production
by MNEs is firms’ most frequently chosen mode of serving foreign markets: According
to UNCTAD (2013), global sales of MNEs’ affiliates are twice as large as global exports,
while comprehensive micro-level evidence shows that MNEs account for disproportion-
ally large shares of aggregate output and employment in many countries (Antrás and
Yeaple, 2014).
In this paper, we study the life-cycle dynamics of MNEs and exporters in the context
of the well-known proximity-concentration tradeoff. In particular, we evaluate the role
played by the firm’s option to become an MNE in exporters’ behavior. We find that in-
cluding MNEs in an otherwise standard dynamic trade model is quantitatively important
to understanding the effects of trade shocks on new exporters dynamics: The life-cycle
responses of exports, regarding exit and growth rates, are much larger in a model that
allows for the option to serve foreign markets through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
than in a model in which that option is not present.
We start by documenting new facts on the life-cycle dynamics of MNEs and exporters.
We exploit the unique characteristics of firm-level data on domestic firms, exporters, and
MNEs from France and Norway and complement them with firm-level data on MNEs
from Germany. We uncover three new facts. First, new exporters in a foreign market
have two to three times higher exit rates than new affiliates of MNEs in the same market.
Second, sales growth profiles are similar between the two groups. Finally, young ex-
porters’ exit rates exhibit gravity—that is, they are strongly correlated with foreign mar-
ket size and distance—whereas those of young MNE affiliates are uncorrelated with these
foreign country characteristics. Our findings are strikingly very similar across the three
economies under study, despite their different structures.
To capture the patterns observed in the data, we build a model of the dynamics of the
proximity-concentration tradeoff, based on the static model of trade and FDI in Helpman
et al. (2004, henceforth, HMY). We introduce dynamics by assuming that firm produc-
tivity evolves according to a Markov process. The model preserves the ranking on the
export and MNE choice from the static model: The most productive firms become MNEs;
the middle ones become exporters; and the least productive firms serve only their home
market. We compare our dynamic version of HMY to the model without MNEs—that is,
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a dynamic Melitz-type model. Without the option of becoming MNEs, the most produc-
tive firms in this model are exporters. The comparison between the two models reveals
that the truncation to the right in the exporters’ productivity distribution created by the
MNE option modifies the average dynamic behavior of exporters. In particular, new ex-
porters in our model with MNEs can have lower growth—and lower exit—rates than in
the model in which firms do not have the option of becoming MNEs simply because the
fastest-growing exporters leave the export status and become MNEs. In the long run,
the comparison between exporters in the model with and without MNEs boils down to
a comparison of the characteristics of exporters in Melitz (2003) and exporters in HMY:
Melitz’s exporters are larger, on average—and have lower exit rates—than exporters in a
world in which the upper right tail becomes MNE.
The effect is quantitatively relevant. Using a calibrated version of our model with MNEs
extended to include sunk entry costs both for export and MNE activities and one without
the option of performing MNE activities, we show that while the two models do about
equally as well in capturing the exit profile of new exporters observed in the data, the
model of the proximity-concentration tradeoff captures the sales profile observed for ex-
porters much better.1 The inclusion of an additional way of serving foreign markets slows
down exporters’ growth, on average, by 35 percent by age four, according to our cali-
bration based on moments for France. Importantly, new exporters’ life-cycle dynamics
after a trade shock are starkly different between the dynamic model of the proximity-
concentration tradeoff and a dynamic Melitz-type model. In the model with MNEs, mov-
ing from a high to a low trade cost environment would drastically increase sales—and
drastically decrease exit rates—of exporters, by age four. In contrast, the same trade costs’
decrease would barely change exporters’ life-cycle behavior in the model without MNEs.
Our mechanism hinges on firms substituting between exports and FDI. Using detailed
firm-level, trade, and product data, the literature has documented that FDI substitutes for
trade when the cost of trade increases.2 We complement this evidence with new facts on
the life-cycle dynamics of the proximity-concentration tradeoff. When firms open a new
affiliate in a foreign country, exports from the parent firm to that country sharply decline
relative to foreign affiliate sales. Simultaneously, some of the firms discontinue exporting
to the destination market altogether. In further support of the mechanism of the model,
we document that exporters that eventually become MNEs already grow much faster
1 The inclusion of sunk entry costs for MNEs is necessary to match the lower exit rates of MNEs with
respect to those of exporters, as well as to capture the fact that young exporters’ exit rates follow gravity,
while MNEs’ do not. Following the literature, we also include sunk entry costs for exporters, but we
calibrate them to be virtually zero.
2 See Gruber and Mutti (1991), Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1998), Bloningen (2001), Head and Ries
(2001), and Amiti and Wakelin (2003), among others.
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before MNE entry than do exporters that never become MNEs. This evidence also high-
lights the importance of distinguishing among different types of exporters when taking
trade models to the data.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the
nascent literature that studies the behavior of exporters and MNEs using dynamic mod-
els. Ramondo et al. (2013), Yalcin and Sala (2014), Fillat and Garetto (2015), and Conconi
et al. (2016) study the proximity-concentration tradeoff in dynamic setups, but none of
them focuses on its consequences for the firm life-cycle behavior.3 Fillat et al. (2015) and
Garetto et al. (2017) do study the life-cycle dynamics of MNEs with a view to their risk-
premium implications and the specialization patterns of affiliates over their life-cycle,
respectively. Both papers restrict their attention to MNEs and do not include exporting as
a mode of entering foreign markets.
Second, we contribute to the extensive literature that studies the dynamics of exporters.
Early work by Baldwin (1989), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), and Dixit (1989), followed
by more recent work by Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Das et al. (2007), Alessandria and Choi
(2007), and Impullitti et al. (2013), point to the importance of the hysteresis created by
sunk investments for understanding the effects of temporary and permanent shocks on
aggregate trade flows and exchange rate movements. Using data for Colombia, Ruhl and
Willis (2017) document facts similar to ours regarding the life-cycle dynamics of exporters,
and show that matching the observed new exporters’ sales growth entails lower estimates
of the sunk entry cost than the ones in the previous literature. All of this literature, in
contrast to a recent literature that uses static quantitative models, has been silent on the
role played by MNEs. Our findings suggest that MNEs are important for understanding
the life-cycle dynamics of exporters and for predicting their responses to trade shocks,
such as a trade liberalization episode.
More generally, there is an extensive literature, summarized by Davis and Haltiwanger
(1999) and, more recently, by Haltiwanger et al. (2013), that has been long concerned with
the life-cycle dynamics of firms, with a particular emphasis on job creation and destruc-
tion. This literature has been devoted to closed-economy setups and has barely included
in its analysis the different modes of internationalization available to the firm. Our find-
3 While Ramondo et al. (2013) include aggregate uncertainty to analyze how the properties of the inter-
national business cycle affect the choice of the entry mode into foreign markets, Fillat and Garetto (2015)
include aggregate uncertainty and sunk entry cost to study the consequences for asset pricing. Conconi
et al. (2016) include a learning mechanism to explain the fact that most firms enter foreign markets as ex-
porters before opening an affiliate there. Yalcin and Sala (2014) study the effects of uncertainty on the
optimal timing and mode of foreign market entry. Early work by Rob and Vettas (2003) features demand
uncertainty together with capacity constraints to study the mechanism behind the choice of firms to export
to—and open affiliates in—the same market.
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ings suggest that not including options that create selection patterns "to-the-right" in the
productivity distribution (i.e., the most productive firms choose to internationalize) may
bias the quantitative implications of the closed-economy dynamic models. According to
our calibration, the inclusion of MNEs entails young exporters that are, on average, three
percent more productive—and 18 percent larger—in their domestic market than young
exporters when the MNE option is not available. This result suggests that even including
only the export option in those closed-economy models has the potential to quantitatively
change the predicted dynamic patterns of the average firm in the domestic market.
The literatures on the life-cycle of both domestic firms and exporters find that models with
heterogeneous firms and idiosyncratic Markov productivity process, as in Hopenhayn
(1992), deliver new firms that grow too large too fast. Both literatures have resorted to
demand frictions to slow down firm growth (see Ruhl and Willis (2017) for exporters and
Foster et al. (2016) for domestic firms).4 We show that it is important to consider the full
set of options available to firms to better account for their life-cycle dynamics: Giving
exporters the possibility of becoming an MNE, a first-order feature of the data, slows
down their life-cycle growth. This finding complements the literature on demand-side
factors.
Finally, the creation of superstar firms linked to the rapid increase in globalization and its
consequences for aggregate outcomes, such as the decline in manufacturing employment
(Boehm et al., 2017) and increasing inequality (Autor et al., 2017), puts selection patterns
"to-the-right" at a central stage and gives them the potential to be quantitatively extremely
relevant. Indeed, the dynamic effects arising from selection "to-the-right" may come not
only from including the different modes of accessing foreign markets to gain customers,
but also from the different modes of accessing foreign markets to gain suppliers, such as
offshoring, licensing, and other global sourcing strategies. This is an important topic for
future research, and its omission has the potential to bias the quantitative implications of
closed-economy dynamic models.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data; Section 3 documents the
facts; Section 4 describes the model; Section 5 presents the calibration; Section 6 presents
the counterfactual exercises and further evidence; and Section 7 concludes.
4 See, among others, Cabral and Mata (2003), Atkenson and Kehoe (2005), Arkolakis (2010), Luttmer
(2011), Drozd and Nosal (2012), and Gourio and Rudanko (2014). See Syverson (2011) for a survey on
productivity-based studies. In relation to exporters’ growth driven by demand factors, papers such as Eaton
et al. (2014), Albornoz et al. (2012), and Morales et al. (2017) focus on the dynamics of trade associated with
learning. Arkolakis (2016) includes the cost of building a customer base in a dynamic model of trade and
shows that his model matches several facts on growth, size, and survival observed in the data. Fitzgerald
et al. (2017) evaluate the importance of demand learning versus costumer-based firm growth.
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2 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on rich firm-level panel datasets from France, Norway,
and Germany. Both the French and the Norwegian data contain information on domestic
firms, exporters, and MNEs in varying levels of detail. In contrast, the German data
contain extremely detailed information on the foreign affiliates of German MNEs, but do
not provide any information on exporters and domestic firms. Our analysis exploits the
strengths of each of the three data sources, all of which cover a period of more than ten
years.
France. The data, which span the years 1999-2011, combine information from several
sources. Information on a firm’s domestic sales is from FICUS (1999-2007) and FARE
(2008-2011); the export data are from the French customs; information on ownership links
between firms in France and between firms in France and abroad are from LiFi; and infor-
mation on foreign affiliate sales is from OFATs (2007, 2009-2011). We restrict the sample
to firms that are subject to the BRN-taxation regime and, for some of the analysis, to the
sub-period 1999-2007.5
The data contain information on each firm’s domestic sales and export sales by destina-
tion, as well as the location of foreign affiliates of French MNEs. Information on foreign
affiliate sales is available only for a subset of large MNEs and for some (non-consecutive)
years.6 While affiliate sales are recorded annually, exports are recorded monthly.
Following Kleinert et al. (2015), we consolidate the information on domestic activities,
exports and foreign affiliates to the level of the French group (i.e., if firms A and B belong
to firm C, we consolidate all three firms). We keep a consolidated firm in the sample if
at least one of its domestic members is active in the manufacturing sector in at least one
year.7 For independent firms, we focus on those that operate in the manufacturing sector
in at least one year. Our sample contains only firms headquartered in France and excludes
French affiliates of foreign MNEs.
We consider MNE-country pairs and exporter-country pairs with multiple entry and exit
5 The FICUS/FARE databases provide balance sheet data on virtually all French firms. The principal
data source is firms’ tax statements. The BRN regime applies to larger firms. We conducted our analysis
also including all firms. As small firms rarely export or conduct FDI, results are very similar. The period
restriction is made in order to avoid structural breaks in the time series, as both the industry classification
and the definition of the domestic sales variable changed in 2008.
6 OFATS is a survey of French MNEs with affiliates outside of the European Union. The sample is biased
towards large MNEs, as a comparison of domestic sales for MNEs in OFATs and the other sources reveals.
7 This consolidation implies that wholesale firms in France may be part of our sample, which is impor-
tant because large French groups often channel exports through wholesale affiliates.
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over the sample period.8 We restrict our attention to majority-owned affiliates of French
MNEs, which account for around 80 percent of all affiliates of French MNEs. We aggre-
gate both exports and FDI at the parent firm-foreign destination-year level. We end up
with a sample of 963,375 firm-year observations. The upper panel of Table D.1 shows that
1.6 percent of firms in our sample are MNEs and 28.7 percent are non-MNE exporters.
French MNEs account for almost 60 percent of employment in our sample, while non-
MNE exporters account for more than 30 percent. The median (mean) French MNE oper-
ates in two (five) markets, with a handful of MNEs serving more than 81 markets, while
the median (mean) exporter serves four (ten) markets, with some exporters serving more
than 178 markets.9
Norway. The data, which span the years 1996-2006, include information on each firm’s
domestic sales, as well as export and foreign affiliate sales by destination country. The
data nest balance sheet information on firms in the Norwegian manufacturing sector
from Statistics Norway’s Capital Database; information on exporters from customs dec-
larations; and data on firms’ foreign operations from the Directorate of Taxes’ Foreign
Company Report. The coverage is comprehensive: All foreign affiliates of Norwegian
firms in the manufacturing sector, as well as 90 percent of Norwegian manufacturing
revenues, are included; firms in the oil sector are excluded.
We consider MNE-country pairs and exporter-country pairs with multiple entry and exit
over the sample period. We include both majority- and minority-owned foreign affili-
ates of Norwegian parents and adjust the affiliate sales by the parent’s ownership share.10
Our sample consists of almost 89,018 firm-year observations. As the lower panel of Table
D.1 shows, only 1.5 percent of Norwegian firms have affiliates abroad, and 36.4 percent
are non-MNE exporters. Norwegian MNEs represent more than 13 percent of total man-
ufacturing employment in Norway, while exporters represent 63 percent. The median
(mean) Norwegian MNE operates in two (four) markets, with a maximum at 37 markets,
while the median (mean) exporter serves three (seven) markets, with a maximum of 122
markets.
Germany. The data, which span the years 1999-2011, contain detailed balance sheet in-
formation about foreign affiliates of German MNEs. The main data source is the Mi-
crodatabase Direct investment (MiDi). Information about parent firms is limited; for in-
stance, it is not possible to distinguish between domestic and export sales of the parent.
8 Restricting the sample to MNE-country and exporter-country pairs with a single entry and exit over
the sample period yields very similar results.
9To preserve confidentiality, the maximum number of markets cannot be reported.
10 A 20 percent ownership threshold, not ten percent, is used to distinguish direct from portfolio in-
vestment. The ownership shares considered for Norway are lower than the ones for France (20 versus 50
percent) in order to gain observations.
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We consolidate the information on direct and indirect ownership shares and restrict our
attention to majority-owned affiliates, which represent 95 percent of foreign affiliates
of German MNEs, and affiliates whose parent operates in the manufacturing sector, or
whose parent is a holding company belonging to a corporate group in the manufac-
turing sector, in at least one year.11 We consolidate affiliates at the parent firm-foreign
destination-year level, and end up with a sample of 37,843 parent-year observations. Only
0.21 percent of German firms have affiliates abroad, but they account for 27 percent of to-
tal sales in Germany (Buch et al., 2005). The median (mean) German MNE operates in
one (three) country(ies), with some parents operating in more than 27 markets.12
3 Facts on the life-cycle dynamics of exporters and MNEs
We document three novel facts about the life-cycle dynamics of MNEs and exporters re-
lated to exit rates, sales growth rates, and the relation between life-cycle variables and the
foreign country characteristics. We focus on new firms that start exporting to—or open an
affiliate in—a foreign country. We further concentrate on non-MNE exporters and MNEs.
That is, we focus on the firm’s main mode of international operation: Only firms that
are not MNEs are considered exporters to a foreign destination, while firms belonging
to the group of MNEs may or may not export contemporaneously to the same foreign
destination.
For both France and Norway, 75 percent of MNEs are exporters to the foreign market in
which they have an affiliate, and about a third of new affiliates in a foreign market start
exports to that market from their headquarter in the year of MNE entry. Observing firms
that export and conduct FDI in the same foreign country at the same time could be due to,
for example, the shipment of intermediate inputs from the parent to the affiliate (Keller
and Yeaple, 2013; Irarrazabal et al., 2013; Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare, 2013). Unfor-
tunately, data that distinguish between intrafirm and arm’s length trade are not system-
atically available, making the study of the behavior of these flows over the life-cycle of
firms impossible. Nonetheless, data from a survey of French MNEs that distinguishes
shipments to related parties from shipments to unrelated parties, for the year 1999, reveal
11 Reporting foreign investments to the German central bank is compulsory, but the reporting require-
ments change over time. We adjust the sample to unify thresholds: We include only affiliates with either
a participation of ten percent and revenues of at least ten million DM (Euro equivalent), or with partici-
pation of at least 50 percent and revenues of at least three million Euro. We consolidate ownership shares
and restrict the sample to majority-owned affiliates only after unifying the reporting threshold. Addition-
ally, parents change sectors over time: About a fifth of parents in manufacturing in some years switch to a
non-manufacturing sector, mainly holding sector, in some other years.
12To preserve confidentiality, the maximum number of markets cannot be reported.
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that, of the set of firm-destination pairs with a positive amount of intrafirm trade (which
indicates that the firm has an affiliate in the foreign market), the average (median) share
of intrafirm exports is 71 (98) percent.13 More than half of firms with intrafirm trade to a
foreign destination also export to that destination arm’s length, suggesting the presence
of shipments from the parent to unrelated parties in a different product than the one pro-
duced by the foreign affiliate in the foreign market.14 Those magnitudes, however, entail
arm’s length flows that are small for the median parent, almost 30 percent for the mean
parent, and concentrated in a few firms.
3.1 Exit rates
We first study the exit patterns of young exporters and young MNEs. We focus on exit
from the current mode of international operation (i.e., exporter or MNE) in a given foreign
country. Our finding is that:
Fact 1. New MNEs in a foreign destination have lower exit rates than new exporters to
that destination.
Figure 1 plots the exit rates for exporters and MNEs, at the firm-destination level, by age.
Exit rates are calculated as the number of MNEs (exporters) that exit a given destination
relative to the number of active MNEs (exporters) in that destination at each age. Age
refers to the number of years after entry in a given market and mode, with age in the
entry year equal to zero. The figure presents an average across all firm-destination pairs.
On average, MNEs in a foreign market have half or one third of the exit rates of exporters
in the same foreign country in their first year of life. For both modes of internationaliza-
tion, exit rates are declining with age, though more drastically for exporters.
It is remarkable that the exit patterns are not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively,
similar for France and Norway.15 The exit patterns for young MNEs at the firm-destination
level are also remarkably similar to the patterns found for MNEs for Germany (Appendix
Figure C.5).
A formal test confirms that French exporters are around 15 percentage points more likely
13 Data for the United States, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004), further reveal that goods for
further processing represent more than 90 percent of total intrafirm trade from the U.S. parent to affiliates
abroad; the remaining ten percent include goods for resale and capital goods. This evidence suggests that
shipments from the parent to the affiliate are mostly related to production sharing.
14 We are extremely thankful to Julien Martin, who graciously calculated these statistics for us.
15 Eaton et al. (2008) document similar exit rates for new Colombian exporters, at the firm-destination
level.
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Notes: Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market,
by mode-market-specific age, for exporters and MNEs. Averages across destinations weighted by each
destination’s share of export (MNE) firms. Exporters refers to non-MNE exporters only.
to exit than foreign affiliates of French MNEs in the first two years after entry, but the
difference disappears later in life. For Norway, the difference in exit rates between ex-
porters and MNEs is 30 percentage points at entry, but, after two years, the difference is
not statistically different from zero. This finding is summarized in Appendix Figure C.1.
Robustness. One may be concerned that the differences in exit rates documented in Fig-
ure 1 are not due to differences between the two modes of internationalization, but that
they are artifacts of definitions of age and exit. Firms may switch between modes so that
exporters become MNEs, and MNEs become exporters, for example. To exclude such pat-
terns from driving our results, we present two robustness results using the French data.
First, we recompute age as the number of years that the firm is active in a market, regard-
less of its international mode of operation; that is, we compute market-specific, rather
than market-mode specific, age. Baseline results still hold, as shown in Appendix Figure
C.2a. Second,we redefine exit as complete exit from the market rather than as exit from
either exporting or MNE activities in a market. Baseline results still hold, as Appendix
Figure C.2b shows.16 Finally, one may be concerned that the entry mode of FDI plays
a role: If MNEs enter a market through Merger and Acquisition (M&A), they take over
pre-existing domestic firms, whereas Greenfield affiliates are, by definition, brand-new
firms. The German data allow us to explore this distinction. Appendix Figure C.6a shows
16 In unreported results for France, we find that our baseline results are robust to: splitting the sample into
European Single Market (ESM) and non-ESM countries to address concerns about the different reporting
thresholds for exports to EU and non-EU members; using the unconsolidated rather than the consolidated
data; and splitting the sample into the 1999-2005 and 2006-2011 periods. Additionally, results at the firm
level are very similar to results at the firm-destination level.
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that there is no difference in exit rates between the two modes of entry of new affiliates of
German MNEs abroad.
3.2 Growth rates
We now analyze the life-cycle sales growth profiles of new MNEs and exporters. Fig-
ure 2 shows the sales growth of exporters and MNE affiliates by age. We focus on firms
that survive for at least four years in a market-mode to attenuate possible bias created
by including low-growth firms that exit the destination immediately upon entry. We de-
mean the firm-destination observations by industry, year, and destination fixed effects.
We normalize sales with respect to one year after entry because the entry year may be
contaminated, particularly for exporters, by the so-called "partial-year effects"—i.e., arti-
ficially high first-year growth rates because of firms that started operations in the middle
of the entry year (see Bernard et al., 2017).
















































Notes: Log of firm-destination export (affiliate) sales with respect to firm-destination export (affiliate) sales
in the year after entry, for firms with five or more years in the market, in each mode. Averages across
destinations weighted by each destination’s share of export (MNE) firms. Log of sales are first demeaned
by industry, year, and destination fixed effects. Exporters refers to non-MNE exporters only.
The figure shows that foreign sales grow at similar rates for French exporters, Norwegian
exporters, and Norwegian MNEs. Growth rates are markedly different only between age
zero and age one, but as outlined above, this difference is likely attributable to partial-year
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effects. We conclude that:
Fact 2. Life-cycle sales growth for exporters is similar to life-cycle sales growth for MNEs.
Appendix Figure C.5b further shows the comparison between Norway and Germany:
Sales profiles for MNEs are quite similar across the two data sources.
Robustness. One may be concerned that normalizing sales growth by the year after entry
is not sufficient to adequately account for partial-year effects. As the French data contain
monthly export sales, we can correct for partial-year effects using the methodology pro-
posed by Bernard et al. (2017). Appendix Figure C.3a confirms that the entry year does
seem contaminated by these effects: Growth at age one is much higher for the calendar-
year data than for the adjusted data; for subsequent ages, growth rates are quite similar,
which gives confidence in the age-one normalization in Figure 2.
To explore whether affiliate-specific or parent-specific effects drive growth patterns, we
show the life-cycle behavior of the ratio of foreign to domestic sales. We find that the
ratio of foreign to domestic sales is rather flat and similar for exporters and MNEs, except
for the entry year, which, again,may be contaminated for exporters by partial-year effects
(Appendix Figure C.3b). This result suggests that factors related to the parent firm are an
important driver of sales growth.
To document the selection induced by non-random survival, Appendix Figure C.4 shows
growth profiles by tenure in the market. As expected, firms that survive longer grow
faster. Notably, the differences are less pronounced for MNEs. Importantly, for all tenure
lengths, exports from age one onwards grow at a similar pace as MNE sales.
Finally, one may be rightly concerned that sales growth rates of new MNEs differ be-
tween new MNE affiliates that enter the market through M&A versus Greenfield FDI.
One may expect that, as brand-new firms, affiliates created through Greenfield FDI grow
faster than affiliates created through M&As. Using the German data, Appendix Figure
C.6b shows that, as expected, MNEs that enter through M&A grow less than MNEs that
enter a market with a Greenfield project. Nonetheless, the differences are not large if one
disregards the entry year, again supporting our normalization choice in Figure 2.
3.3 Gravity
The previous two facts pool firms across different destination countries. Country char-
acteristics, however, may be an important determinant of firms’ life-cycle decisions. To
explore this issue, we study the correlation between the first-year exit rates (i.e., exit rates
at age zero) of exporters and MNEs, respectively, and two country characteristics that are
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prominent in the international trade literature: the size of the receiving country, as mea-
sured by GDP; and the distance of the receiving country from the firm’s home country.
Our finding is that:
Fact 3. Young exporters’ exit rates exhibit gravity, whereas MNEs’ do not.
Figure 3 shows scatter plots of the first-year exit rate against market size (upper panels),
and distance (lower panel). We restrict the sample to countries with at least ten firm-
destination observations. We show results for French exporters and MNEs and relegate
results for Norway, which are extremely similar, to Appendix Figure C.7.
The cross-country patterns of first-year exit between the two modes of international op-
eration are strikingly different: While exporters operating in smaller and more distant
markets are more likely to stop operations right after entry, it is not clear that affiliates
of MNEs do. In fact, an Ordinary-Least- Square (OLS) regression shows that the exit
probability increases by almost seven percentage points when distance doubles, and it
decreases by 3.4 percentage points when GDP doubles, with both coefficients significant
at one percent. In contrast, the effects of GDP and distance on the exit rates of MNE
affiliates are insignificant.17
Robustness. As Figure 3 shows, exporters and MNEs are active in different countries:
French firms penetrate many more countries as exporters than as MNEs. To exclude that
the difference in country coverage drives the results, we replicate our analysis for only
those countries with both exporting and multinational activity. As Appendix Figure C.8
shows, results are robust to considering the same set of countries for exporters and MNEs;
the pattern for exporters is less pronounced than in the full sample but is still clearly
correlated with country characteristics.18
4 The dynamics of the proximity-concentration tradeoff
In this section, we present a dynamic model of exports and MNE activities that builds on
the model of the proximity-concentration tradeoff with heterogeneous firms in HMY. As
in the original framework, when firms decide to serve foreign markets through exports
or FDI, they trade off the magnitude of trade costs versus the magnitude of plant-level
fixed costs. Additionally, as in the original framework, the model is exclusively about
17 In unreported results, we also find that country characteristics do not significantly affect first-year exit
rates of German MNEs.
18 OLS coefficients for (log) GDP and (log) distance are, respectively, -0.023 (s.e. 0.003) and 0.046 (s.e.
0.005).
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Distance, km (logs)
Notes: Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, for
exporters and MNEs, in the first year upon market-mode entry (i.e., age zero). Destinations with ten or more
firm-year observations and with available GDP data. Exporters refers to non-MNE exporters only. GDP data
from International Financial Statistics (IMF). Distance data from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago, 2011).
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"horizontal" FDI—i.e., FDI destined to serve the foreign market; export-platforms (i.e.,
locating production in market l and serving a third market n through exports from l) and
production-sharing considerations (i.e., intrafirm trade) are excluded.19
We proceed in two steps. First, to better isolate the role played by MNEs, we add a
Markov process for firm-level productivity to the model in HMY and show how the op-
tion to become an MNE affects the dynamic behavior of exporters. Second, we enrich
the model with a sunk entry cost for MNE activities to capture the differences in the exit
behavior of MNEs and exporters documented in Facts 1 and 3 in Section 3.
One remark is in place. Being exclusively about substitution forces, our model does not
capture simultaneous trade and FDI flows to a given market. Our dynamic model, how-
ever, can easily accommodate trade flows in intermediate inputs from the parent to the
affiliate: Without aggregate shocks, the way that these flows are introduced in the static
models, such as in Irarrazabal et al. (2013) and Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013),
carries over the dynamic setup. We do not incorporate intrafirm flows into the model
since data on related-party trade along the life-cycle of the MNE are not available, and,
more importantly, these flows do not affect the main mechanism presented below. An
additional way of incorporating simultaneous exports and FDI in the same market by
the same firm is to consider multi-product firms, as in Tintelnot (2017). We leave multi-
product considerations outside of the model for two reasons. First, the evidence pre-
sented at the beginning of Section 3 suggests that these flows are small for most of the
firm-destination pairs, even though they are concentrated in large firms. And, second,
data at the product level for both exports and MNE activities are not available.
4.1 Baseline model
We construct a partial equilibrium model with two countries, Home and Foreign. Time
is discrete. Labor is the only factor of production and is supplied in fixed quantity. The
wage in each country is pinned down by a constant-return-to-scale freely tradable homo-
geneous good sector, and normalized to one, w = 1.
Goods that are exported to the foreign country are subject to an iceberg-type trade cost,
τ ≥ 1, while production in foreign affiliates is subject to an efficiency loss given by γ ≥ 1,
with τ > γ, consistent with the empirical evidence (Antrás and Yeaple, 2014). A firm
that exports incurs a per-period fixed cost, fx, and a firm that operates an affiliate in the
19 The empirical evidence indicates that most FDI is horizontal: Ramondo et al. (2016) document that the
median foreign affiliate of U.S. MNEs ships zero goods to its parent; 66 percent of its sales are devoted to
unaffiliated parties in the host market of operations.
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foreign country incurs a per-period fixed cost fm, with fm/fx > (γ/τ)σ−1, as in HMY.
Fixed costs are paid in units of labor.
A firm is characterized by a core efficiency level, φ ≡ exp(z), that evolves over time fol-
lowing a first-order autoregressive AR(1) process,
z′ = ρz + σǫǫ
′,
where 0 ≤ ρ < 1 and ǫ′ ∼ N(0, 1). If a firm from the Home country opens an affiliate in
the Foreign country, that affiliate inherits its parent’s productivity process.
There exists a continuum of firms that compete monopolistically, and have access to a
continuum of differentiated products. The mass of Home firms, M , is fixed and nor-
malized to one. We assume Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution (CES) preferences, with
the elasticity of substitution denoted by σ. Firms optimally charge a constant mark-up,
κ ≡ σ/(σ − 1), over marginal costs, so that sales follow the standard CES formula. Let
E ≡ κ1−σX/P 1−σ be the size of demand in Foreign. We normalize Ehome = 1 so that E is
the size of Foreign relative to Home.
Static profit maximization implies that domestic sales are given by
Xd(φ) = φσ−1, (1)
while exports from Home are
Xx(φ) = Eφσ−1τ 1−σ, (2)
and sales of Home affiliates in Foreign are
Xm(φ) = Eφσ−1γ1−σ. (3)
Each period, firms decide whether to be domestic and produce in the domestic market for
domestic consumers only; or to export and produce in the domestic market for domestic
and foreign consumers; or to become an MNE and produce in the domestic market for
domestic consumers and in the foreign market for foreign consumers. As there are no
sunk costs of entry, these decisions are static: Given their productivity draw, each period,
firms decide whether they become MNEs or exporters or stay domestic.













+ βEV (φ′ | φ). (4)
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A firm exports whenever φ > φ̄x, where the export cutoff is defined by
1
σ
Xx(φ̄x)− fx = 0, (5)






























As τ > γ, foreign affiliate sales are higher than export sales for a given level of productiv-
ity. Additionally, the assumption on variable and fixed costs implies that φ̄m > φ̄x, as in
HMY, so that MNEs are more productive than exporters. Finally, with symmetric wages,
that same assumption ensures that export-platforms are never the preferred option.
The effects of the MNE option on exporters’ life-cycle behavior. We now compare a
dynamic model with MNEs and exporters to a model with exporters but no MNEs. This
amounts to comparing a dynamic HMY model of the proximity-concentration tradeoff
with a dynamic Melitz model in which dynamics are introduced as a Markov process for
firm-level productivity. The dynamic Melitz model is obtained by simply setting γ (or
fm) to infinity.
In the static setup, comparing the two models would amount to comparing the model
in HMY with Melitz (2003). This comparison is useful because the corresponding dy-
namic models have the same properties in the steady state (across firms of different ages).
It is straightforward that, under the same value of parameters, exporters in the Melitz
model are, on average, more productive than exporters in a model of the proximity-
concentration tradeoff: The most productive firms choose to serve foreign markets through
FDI when they are given that additional option and abandon exports. Even in the static
model, adding options to the firm’s choice set changes the size distribution of exporters.
The effect hinges on having the distribution of productivity for exporters truncated to the
left and right, rather than just to the left.
As in the static setup, in our baseline dynamic setup, the model without MNEs delivers
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the same productivity cutoff for export activities as the one in (7). Differences between the
two models come from the truncation-to-the-right in the productivity distribution created
by the MNE option, given by the cutoff in (8).
The first difference is that the value of the firm in the dynamic model with MNEs is higher
than in the dynamic model with only exporters: The maximum operator in the middle
term of (4) is over three, rather than two, terms.
The second difference refers to growth rates. Importantly, the model with MNEs delivers
the possibility that exporters have lower (geometric) average growth rates of productivity
than exporters in the model without MNEs. Proposition 1 proves the result for an AR(1)
productivity process with enough persistence.
Proposition 1. Assume that firm productivity follows a first-order autoregressive process,
zt+1 = ρzt + σǫǫt+1, with ǫt+1 ∼ N(0, 1), and 0 ≤ ρ < 1. For a firm that exports in t and
t−1, expected productivity growth in a model with only left truncation in the productivity
distribution is defined by ∆ZLt ≡ E (zt − zt−1 | zt > z, zt−1 > z), while in a model with left
and right truncation, ∆ZLRt ≡ E (zt − zt−1 | zt > z, zt−1 > z, zt < z̄, zt−1 < z̄), with z and z̄
denoting the left and right truncation points, respectively. Then, there exists ρ∗ such that
for ρ > max(ρ∗, 0), ∆ZLt > ∆Z
LR
t , and for ρ = ρ
∗, ∆ZLt = ∆Z
LR
t .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, the option of becoming an MNE not only truncates the distribution of pro-
ductivities, but also induces a truncation to-the-right of the export sales growth distribu-
tion. Only firms with productivity above the export—but below the MNE—productivity
threshold, in two consecutive periods, contribute to export sales growth. For each ex-
porter productivity level z, there is a maximum possible increase in productivity such
that the exporter remains an exporter. Exporters that receive a higher productivity shock
turn into MNEs when the MNE option is allowed. Those exporters with the highest pro-
ductivity shocks and, thus, the highest sales growth do not contribute to the average
growth rate of exporters in the model with MNEs, but they do so in the model without
MNEs. Furthermore, because the maximum possible growth in productivity decreases
with productivity levels, smaller exporters that turn into MNEs are the ones contributing
to average productivity in the model without MNEs, but they do not contribute to it in the
model with MNEs. This effect results in a higher average productivity early in life—and,
in turn, lower exit rates—for exporters in the model for which the MNE option is present.
Finally, the effects of changing trade costs on the exporters’ dynamic behavior are also
different across the model with and without MNEs. Examining the export productivity
cutoff in (7) reveals that it increases with τ . In contrast, the MNE productivity cutoff
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in (8) decreases with τ . Hence, a lower τ increases the MNE productivity cutoff and
decreases the export productivity cutoff, decreasing the likelihood of becoming an MNE.
In the extreme, for τ = 1, MNEs disappear and the model collapses to the one without
MNEs. These effects imply that, on average, exporters’ life-cycle profiles are less similar
in the models with and without MNEs for high values of trade costs, and become more
similar as τ decreases toward one. Additionally, it is worth noting that a change in trade
costs produces a much more drastic change in the average life-cycle profiles of exporters
in the model with MNEs. This is due, again, simply to changes to the truncation to the
right: While the model without MNEs has only one (left) margin moving, the model with
MNEs has two (left and right) margins changing at the same time. These changes in
cutoffs translate into more pronounced changes in the average growth rate and exit rates
along the life cycle of exporters.
Summing up, exporters in the model with MNEs have different life-cycle characteristics
from those in the model without MNEs due to the additional truncation-to-the-right cre-
ated by the option of serving markets through FDI. The mechanism has the potential to
better reconcile the canonical model with the data, and to complement other demand-side
mechanisms proposed in the literature that have been included in models to bring them
closer to the data (see Footnote 4 in the introduction).
The effects created by a problem with additional choices that truncate the distribution
of productivity to the right are not specific to the problem of choosing how to serve a
foreign market. For instance, firms can be given the option of choosing to source inputs
from only the domestic market or from the domestic and foreign markets; firms can be
given the option of operating one technology or of choosing from different vintages of a
technology; or, households can be given the option of choosing from one occupation or
from many occupations.
The relevant question becomes whether, quantitatively, the differences created by an addi-
tional truncation point are large enough to change the results of the counterfactual exer-
cises. In our context, we are interested in measuring whether a model with MNEs delivers
exporters’ life-cycle patterns that respond differently to trade shocks—such as a trade lib-
eralization episode—than in a model without MNEs. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to
answering that question.
4.2 Extended model: sunk MNE costs
The dynamic HMY model qualitatively captures some, but not all, of the facts docu-
mented in Section 3. In particular, the baseline model is able to capture Fact 2: Conditional
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on entry, the model predicts equal growth rates for exporters and MNEs. This result arises
simply from assuming the same productivity process for domestic, exporting, and MNE
firms. The baseline model, however, cannot reproduce Fact 3 that states that exit rates for
exporters vary negatively with size and positively with transport costs, while exit rates
for MNEs do not; both MNE and exporter exit rates vary systematically with country
characteristics. Regarding Fact 1, the baseline model may be able to capture the lower
exit rates of new MNEs relative to the ones of new exporters, but most likely, will not
reproduce the large difference observed in those exit rates, particularly upon entry.
We extend the baseline model by adding sunk costs for MNE entry. Adding sunk costs
turns the MNE problem in a fully dynamic problem. Firms have two possible states:
producing in the home market for domestic consumers only and, potentially, for foreign
consumers (D); or producing in the home market for domestic consumers and in the for-
eign market for foreign consumers (M).
The value functions are modified to reflect the presence of sunk MNE costs, Fm > 0,
which are also paid in units of labor. The value of being a multinational firm with core
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− fx) +βEV (φ′, D | φ)} . (10)
As is well-known from the literature, a sunk entry cost creates persistence in firms’ status.
The optimal policy for an MNE is to discontinue the foreign investment if being domes-
tic (state D) entails larger discounted expected profits than being MNE (state M). This
policy is characterized by a cutoff value of productivity φ̄m. If productivity falls below
φ̄m, a current MNE exits the foreign market and produces only in the domestic market.
If productivity exceeds φ̄m, the firm remains an MNE (state M). Similarly, the optimal
policy for a domestic firm is characterized by a productivity cutoff level, φ̄me . Once the
productivity level of the domestic firm exceeds φ̄me , it becomes an MNE. It is possible
to rank the two productivity cut-offs. Since the second terms in the outer maximization
problem in (9) and (10), respectively, are identical, and Xm and V are increasing in φ, as
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the expectation operator preserves monotonicity, it follows that φ̄m < φ̄me . This implies
that the model delivers an "inaction" zone that exists by virtue of the sunk cost of doing
FDI. Domestic firms with productivity φ ∈ [φ̄m, φ̄me ] remain domestic, while MNEs with
productivity φ ∈ [φ̄m, φ̄me ] remain MNEs. The inaction zone, thus, creates persistence in
the MNE status.
In the dynamic setup without sunk MNE costs, it suffices to have fm/fx > (γ/τ)1−σ for
MNEs to have a higher exit cutoff than exporters, φ̄m > φ̄x. In the dynamic setup with
sunk MNE costs, that assumption is not enough. We proceed by simply assuming that
the MNE exit cutoff is higher than the exporter exit cutoff. Nonetheless, we preserve the
assumption on parameters made in the static and dynamic setups without sunk costs.20
The model with MNE sunk costs gives rise to the possibility that exit rates for MNEs are
much lower than for exporters: The presence of sunk costs creates a non-entry/non-exit
zone, as shown in Baldwin (1989), that makes MNE exit less likely than in the setup with
no sunk costs. This result, however, depends on the values of the model’s parameters.
The inclusion of sunk MNE costs allows the model to qualitatively replicate Fact 3: Exit
rates of young exporters are correlated with country characteristics, while for MNEs, they
are not. The following proposition shows the result.
Proposition 2. Let z̄ be the productivity exit cutoff from a mode of international opera-
tion. The increase in the first-year exit probability when z̄ increases is larger when sunk
costs of entry into the mode are zero than when sunk costs are positive.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Because of MNE sunk costs, the productivity level required for MNE entry exceeds the
productivity level at exit, φ̄me > φ̄
m. Conditional on entry, the higher the sunk costs, Fm,
the higher the option value of being MNE and, hence, the larger the zone of inaction and
the less sensitive the exit behavior to differences in variable profits.
4.3 Additional predictions
The model’s mechanism is based on selection on productivity; that is, all new MNEs have
received a sufficiently good productivity shock that induces entry. Under the AR(1) as-
sumption for productivity, the firm status before entry plays a role in subsequent life-cycle
20 The assumption that φ̄m > φ̄x is implicit in the way we wrote the value functions: It rules out that, for
the marginal MNE, the value of producing at home for the domestic market only is higher than the value
of producing at home for the domestic and foreign market. In our calibrations and simulations below, this
ranking of cutoffs is never violated.
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dynamics. In particular, firms that enter MNE status from exporting have, due to their
higher productivity, a different life-cycle than firms that enter from domestic activities
only.
In this section, we first formally show that firm status matters for the exit behavior of
firms, and then we look for support in the data. We show the result for the case with sunk
MNE costs, but the result does not hinge on them.
Proposition 3. Assume that a firm switches from exporting to MNE activity. The prob-
ability that the new MNE exits upon entry is lower than if the firm had switched from
domestic to MNE activity.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proposition shows, essentially, that if two firms, one with high and one with low
productivity, enter the MNE status, the one with lower productivity is more likely to
exit upon entry. As long as exporters are more productive than domestic firms, firms
that have export experience enter MNE status with a productivity level that is higher
than that of a firm with no export experience. Given that productivity follows a Markov
process with log-normal distributed shocks, and the exit cutoffs are the same for MNEs
with and without export experience, larger firms at the time of entry are less likely to have
a productivity draw that falls below the exit cutoff in the subsequent period.
Naturally, Proposition 3 predicts that experienced MNEs should have lower exit rates
than non-experienced MNEs upon entry. The data support this prediction. As shown
in Appendix Figure C.9, for France, new MNE affiliates with previous export experience
in a given foreign market have around ten-percentage-point lower exit rate in the first
year after entry than do new MNE affiliates without such experience. The difference
disappears as firms grow older.21 Additionally, it is worth mentioning that new MNEs
that have exported to a foreign market before MNE entry represent almost 60 percent of
new MNEs for France (47 percent for Norway).22
The selection on productivity, together with the sunk MNE costs, leads to additional pre-
dictions on the size of MNEs and exporters, respectively, at entry and exit. The presence
of sunk MNE costs predicts that MNEs that are larger at entry than at exit, while the lack
of sunk export costs predicts that exporters should be of roughly equal size at entry and
exit. Table D.2 in the appendix shows the average size at entry and exit for exporters and
21 Unreported evidence for Norway results in a significant difference in exit rates between experienced
and non-experienced MNEs only for the first year after MNE entry.
22 Most MNEs have one to two years of export experience in a given foreign market. In contrast, it is
worth noting that firms that enter a market as exporters after MNE entry represent less than 0.2 percent of
new exporters in a market.
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MNEs, in their different transitions (e.g., domestic to MNE status). Size is given by (log)
domestic sales. MNEs are larger at entry than at exit, clearly supporting our inclusion of
sunk MNE costs in the model; exporters are also larger at entry than at exit, but the result
is not significant for Norway. Given the mixed evidence, we include sunk export costs in
the calibrated version of the model. They will turn out to be virtually zero.
5 Calibration
We next calibrate the model with sunk costs of both MNE and export entry and analyze
how well the calibrated model quantitatively captures the patterns observed in the data.
Appendix B presents the setup and main equations of the full model with export and
MNE sunk costs.
We perform two calibrations using moments from France and Norway, alternately, to
calibrate the parameters of the model.23 We quantitatively assess the model by comparing
the facts in Section 3 with the ones constructed from the simulated data.
We calibrate the model using the top 15 destination markets for exports and MNEs, plus a
sixteenth country constructed as a weighted average of the rest of the world (RoW), both
for France and Norway. The top 15 destinations represent more than 75 percent of export
and MNE sales.24
For each destination, we calibrate the values of the iceberg trade and MNE costs, the
per-period export and MNE fixed costs, the sunk costs of MNE and export entry, and
the relative market size. Consistent with the model presented in the previous section, the
original HMY framework, and the empirical evidence, we focus exclusively on horizontal
sales of affiliates and proceed under the assumption that there are no export-platforms
sales, so that entry into each destination country can be solved independently from the
rest.
Finally, as in the model, we restrict the analysis to a partial equilibrium setting since we
are interested in the properties of firm-level dynamics.
23 We present the calibration for Norway because the information on MNE sales in the French data to
construct a life-cycle sales profile is very limited. We are interested, however, in comparing the model with
the data in this dimension.
24 In the French data, it is not possible to distinguish exports to Belgium from exports to Luxembourg.
Therefore, we aggregate Belgium-Luxembourg and the Netherlands into one country (Benelux). Due to its
increasing importance, we add China to the list of French foreign sales’ destination.
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5.1 Calibration procedure
We set σ = 4, which implies a mark-up over unit cost of 33 percent and is the common
value estimated for the trade elasticity. The discount factor for firms, captured by the
parameter β, is set to 0.95, which is consistent with an interest rate of five percent. The
measure of firms M is normalized to one in each country.
The parameters characterizing the Markov process for firm-level productivity, ρ and σǫ,
come from estimating a first-order autoregressive process on domestic sales, by OLS,
using all French and Norwegian firms (i.e., unbalanced panel). We set ρ = ρsales and
σǫ = σsales/(σ− 1). The regression includes year and industry fixed effects, with standard
errors clustered at the industry level. For France, ρ = 0.960 and σǫ = 0.197, while for
Norway, our estimates imply that ρ = 0.957 and σǫ = 0.133.25








for firms serving market n, to get an estimate of trade-cost-adjusted market n’s size. Anal-








n , for MNE affiliates operating in market n, to get an estimate of MNE-cost-adjusted
market n’s size.26 We calculate rxn and r
m
n , respectively, as a weighted average across firms
serving market n in each mode, with weights given by the firm’s domestic sales. For
exports, we restrict attention to firms that served market n at least three years in a row.
For MNEs, we do not limit the number of years in a market (given the low number of




The remaining four parameters of the model are jointly calibrated, for each market: the
per-period fixed cost of exporting, fxn ; the per-period fixed cost of MNE, f
m
n ; the MNE
sunk cost, Fmn ; and the export sunk cost, F
x
n . We target four moments, for each market:
the fraction of non-MNE exporters serving market n; the fraction of French MNEs serv-
ing market n; the probability of MNE exit at age zero (i.e., entry year) from market n;
and the probability of export exit at age zero from market n. Appendix Table D.4 shows
averages across destinations for the four targeted moments, in the model and in the data,
as well as the correlation coefficient between data and model, for France and Norway,
respectively. Appendix Table D.5 shows the four targeted moments by destination, in the
model and data, while Appendix Table D.6 presents the calibrated parameters, for France
and Norway, respectively.
25 Results are very similar if we estimate a Tobit model rather than a linear model.
26 For France, to gain observations, for some destinations, we impute missing MNE sales using as covari-
ates (log) domestic sales, (log) domestic employment, an interaction of the two previous variables, year and
sector fixed effects, for firms surviving at least five years in a foreign destination.
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5.2 Calibration results
We find that the calibrated model does well at quantitatively capturing the facts presented
in Section 3. We first compare the exit rates of exporters and MNEs, by age, in the data
and the model. Our calibration procedure targets exit rates of MNEs and exporters, re-
spectively, only at entry. Second, we show that the export sales and affiliate sales (relative
to the year after entry), by age, are very similar in the data and the model. Third, we
assess the model’s ability to capture the observed elasticities of exit rates at entry with re-
spect to country characteristics, for MNEs and exporters, respectively. Finally, we assess
the model’s ability to capture other non-targeted moments.
Figure 4 shows that the quantitative model captures fairly well, on average, the exit pat-
terns of young exporters and MNEs. Even with zero calibrated export sunk costs, the
model falls short in capturing the high exit rates for exporters at entry. At later ages, the
calibrated model closely mimics the data. For MNEs, the calibrated model captures the
decline in exit rates with age, except for age one; however, it delivers exit rates that tend
to be higher than in the data.
Figure 5 shows the ability of the model to capture the growth profiles for new MNEs and
new exporters. We show a geometric average across destination markets and normalize
sales with respect to age one (i.e., one year after entry). The model matches the sales
profile for exporters remarkably well, even though exporters, by age four, grow faster in
the model than in the data. As we will show in the next section, the calibrated model
with MNEs improves the fit to the data with respect to a model with only exporters (i.e.,
a dynamic version of the Melitz model). Additionally, the calibrated model does a fairly
good job at picking growth profiles for new MNEs; the smooth growth observed in the
data is also present in the model.
To evaluate the model’s ability to quantitatively capture Fact 3 in Section 3, we calculate,
in the data and in the model, by OLS, the elasticity of exit rates at age zero for exporters






n ), across the
destinations included in our calibration, for Norway and France, respectively. Results are
presented in the first rows of Table 1.27 One has to keep in mind that these regressions
have only 16 observations, so they are only suggestive. Still, the model delivers sharper
results for exporters than for MNEs, as the theory predicts and our third fact shows: New
exporters’ exit rates decrease with geography-adjusted country size, while new MNEs’
27 We evaluate the ability of the calibrated model to replicate those elasticities because, even though we
target first-year exit rates in the calibration procedure, the match, particularly for exporters, is not perfect.
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Notes: Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, by
mode-market-specific age, for exporters and MNEs. Averages across destinations included in the calibra-
tion, weighted by each destination’s share of export (MNE) firms. Weights are data-based and model-based,
for data and model variables, respectively. Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters only.
exit rates do not have a clear pattern.
Regarding other non-targeted moments in Table 1, as shown in Proposition 3, the cal-
ibrated model correctly captures the fact that new experienced MNEs have lower exit
rates than non-experienced MNEs. Yet the calibrated model delivers virtually zero new
MNEs that were not previously exporters. Additionally, in the data, the share of exporters
(MNEs) that start and stop exporting (MNE activity) are very similar. The model captures
this fact because, in the stationary equilibrium, these two rates are equal. The calibrated
25

















































































































































Notes: Log of firm-destination export (affiliate) sales with respect to firm-destination export (affiliate) sales in the
year after entry, for firms with five or more years in the market, in each mode. Averages across destinations included
in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export (MNE) firms. Weights are data-based and model-
based, for data and model variables, respectively. In the data, log of sales are first demeaned by industry, year, and
destination fixed effects. Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters only.
model, however, does not capture the higher rates observed for exporters vis-á-vis MNEs.
Finally, the model captures rather accurately the transitions from export and domestic sta-
tus, particularly for France. The model over-predicts the transition from MNE to export
status and under-predicts the transition from MNE to domestic status.
Overall, given its parsimony in terms of shocks and number of parameters, the calibrated
model does a rather good job of matching the patterns observed in the data.
5.2.1 The size of export and MNE costs
We now evaluate the size of the calibrated per-period fixed costs and sunk entry costs, for
exports and MNE activities. We first calculate theses costs in terms of a year of firm sales,
and then, we translate them into a monetary value.
Sunk costs, particularly for exports, do not seem to be a heavy burden on firms decid-
ing to internationalize.28 Fixed operating costs, however, are relatively much larger. Our
calibrated per-period and sunk costs for MNEs correspond to an average ratio of produc-
tivity, between the marginal firm that enters and the marginal firm that exits MNE status,
of 1.14, both for France and Norway, whereas for exporters the analogous ratio is one.
The middle panel of Table 2 shows that, for MNEs, sunk costs represent more than ten
percent of year sales for smaller firms and around five percent for larger firms, according
28 Our estimates are even smaller than the ones in Ruhl and Willis (2017) for Colombian exporters. They
use a model like the one we present here, but without MNEs, that they extend to accommodate demand
frictions. Their estimate of sunk export costs is of 12,000 U.S. dollars.
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Table 1: Additional non-targeted moments, data and model.
Data Model
France Norway France Norway
Elasticity of first-year exit rates to size-adjusted iceberg costs
exporters -0.048* -0.023 -0.036*** -0.085***
MNEs 0.038 0.063 0.037 0.061
Share of experienced MNEs 0.60 0.47 0.99 0.99
Exit rates at age zero, experienced MNEs 0.21 0.16 0.25 0.18
Exit rates at age zero, non-experienced MNEs 0.29 0.21 0.33 0.24
Stopper rates
exporters 0.316 0.313 0.210 0.209
MNEs 0.182 0.149 0.231 0.208
Starter rate
exporters 0.389 0.334 0.210 0.209
MNEs 0.169 0.180 0.231 0.208
Probability of:
exporter to MNE 0.003 0.002 0.009 0.007
exporter to domestic 0.188 0.275 0.202 0.203
domestic to MNE 2.0e-05 5.0e-04 1.3e-08 3.4e-09
domestic to exporter 0.019 0.102 0.020 0.019
MNE to exporter 0.059 0.069 0.231 0.208
MNE to domestic 0.043 0.049 3e-05 3e-05




, respectively, for exporters
and MNEs) is the OLS coefficient of a bivariate regression (with a constant), using the16 countries included in the
calibration, for France and Norway, alternately (levels of significance denoted by *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and *
p < 0.1). The fraction of experienced MNEs is calculated as the number of new MNEs of age zero with previous
export experience in a market, relative to all new MNEs of age zero entering that market. Stopper (starter) rates are
calculated as the share of all exporters (MNEs) that exit (enter) relative to all exporters (MNEs), a given destination.
The transition probabilities are calculated for all firms, a weighted average across destinations: exporter to MNE
(domestic) is relative to the number of non-MNE exporters; domestic to MNE (exporter) is relative to the number of
domestic firms; and MNE to exporter (domestic) is relative to the number of MNEs. Averages across destinations
included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export (MNE) firms. Weights are data-based and
model-based, for data and model variables, respectively. Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters only.
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average 0.067 3.514 0.0003 2.159 0.119 5.42 0.0001 2.849
Values as % of sales
25th sales pc 23.5 18.6 0.10 11.4 17.7 13.0 0.014 6.8
50th sales pc 17.8 15.3 0.07 9.4 11.6 9.8 0.009 5.2
75th sales pc 11.8 11.4 0.05 7.0 6.2 6.3 0.005 3.3
90th sales pc 7.6 8.0 0.03 4.9 3.2 3.6 0.002 1.9
Values in U.S. dollars
25th sales pc 1,309 386,324 5 237,429 2,054 561,672* 2 295,217*
50th sales pc 5,991 1,107,230 24 680,488 7,632 1,401,336* 6 736,548*
75th sales pc 26,981 2,995,292 110 1,840,863 22,486 2,624,685* 17 1,379,545*
90th sales pc 87,376 7,160,481 356 4,400,728 54,575 4,808,348* 42 2,527,287*
Notes: fx
n
are per-period fixed export costs; fm
n
are per-period fixed MNE costs; F x
n
are sunk export costs; and
Fm
n
are sunk MNE costs. Sales percentiles are with respect to the export sales distribution, for the case of costs
related to exports, and for the MNE sales distribution, for the case of costs related to MNEs. The values in U.S.
dollars for different percentiles are calculated using the values of sales in the data, transformed to U.S. dollars
using an average of the annual exchange rate observed over our sample period, from Penn World Tables 9.0
(Feenstra et al., 2015). (*) estimated values assuming that the xth pc of the MNE sales distribution is proportional
to the xth pc of the export sale distribution, with the proportionality factor calculated using the ratio of export to
MNE sales for each percentile, for Norway. Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted
by each destination’s share of export (MNE) firms. Weights are data-based and model-based, for data and model
variables, respectively.
to our calibration for Norway. For French MNEs, in terms of sales, our calibration sug-
gests that these sunk costs are half those faced by Norwegian MNEs. In monetary terms,
for Norwegian MNEs, sunk costs range from less than 300,000 to almost five million U.S.
dollars. In contrast, the calibrated sunk export costs are very small, around 0.1 percent
of export sales in a given year. Per-period costs represent around six percent of foreign
sales for large Norwegian exporters and reach almost 20 percent for small exporters; per-
period MNEs costs are slightly larger. Our calibrated values for French exporters and
MNEs entail lower per-period costs, in terms of year sales, than for Norwegian firms. In
monetary terms, given the difference in size between MNEs and exporters, per-period
fixed costs for exporters are only 70,000 U.S. dollars for the 90th percentile of Norwegian
exporters, but reach almost eight million U.S. dollars for the largest MNEs. Appendix
Table D.7 presents results by destination market for the median exporter (MNE) in terms
of sales in each destination.
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6 The role of MNEs in new exporters’ dynamics
Armed with the calibrated model, we quantitatively analyze the role of MNEs in the life-
cycle dynamics of exporters. This is analogous to saying that we evaluate the importance
of the dynamics of the proximity-concentration tradeoff. To this end, we compare our
calibrated model with a calibrated version of the model with only exporters. We first
show that the calibrated model with MNEs matches the data on exporters’ life-cycle sales
profiles better than the calibrated model without MNEs. More importantly, having both
calibrated models, we show that not including FDI as an option to serve foreign markets
has consequences for the counterfactual exercises. That is, we show the importance of
including "truncation to the right" in the productivity distribution of exporters. In par-
ticular, our exercises show that the properties of the (steady-state) life-cycle dynamics for
exporters before and after a trade-liberalization episode differ greatly between the model
with only exporters and the model with both exporters and MNEs. Finally, we also ana-
lyze whether exporters have a role in MNE dynamics; the answer is negative, reinforcing
the powerful effects of having both-sided truncation problems.
The model with only exporters is calibrated to match the share and the exit probability of
exporters at age zero, in each market n, observed in the data. In this way, we pin down
the per-period fixed cost of exporting, fxn and the sunk export cost, F
x
n ; all remaining
parameters are calibrated as in the baseline calibration. The calibrated model with only
exporters matches the export-related targeted and non-targeted moments in Tables D.4
and 1, respectively, equally well as the baseline model with MNEs (not shown). Appendix
Table D.6 shows the calibrated values for fxn and F
x
n for the model without MNEs. As
expected, the calibrated values for the fixed costs of exporting are larger in the model
without MNEs than in the model with MNEs, whereas the sunk costs of export entry are
virtually zero in both models.
Next, we turn to the two key facts on exporters’ life-cycle dynamics: exit rates and sales
growth.
Figure 6a compares exit rates for exporters, averaged across destination markets, in the
data and in the calibrated model with and without MNEs, for France. Appendix Figure
C.10 shows results by destination market. There is barely any difference in the pattern of
exit for young exporters across the two models. Both models fail to capture the high exit
rates of exporters at age one, but improve substantially in matching exit rates for older
ages. Results for Norway are in Appendix Figure C.13a.
In contrast, there are substantial differences between the two calibrated models for the
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export sales profile shown in Figure 6b: The model with MNEs produces sales profiles
for exporters that are flatter and closer to the data. This finding reflects Proposition 1,
which predicts that a model with left and right truncation yields exporters that grow more
slowly than exporters in a model with only left truncation, given an AR(1) productivity
process with enough persistence. Notably, our calibrations suggest that, quantitatively,
the effect is large: We obtain a difference of almost ten percentage points by age four,
on average, for France.29 Differences are even larger when we consider some popular
destinations for French exports: Inspecting Appendix Figure C.11 reveals, for instance,
that when we consider the United States as the destination for French exports, the model
without MNEs delivers sales, relative to age one, that are 15 percentage points higher
than in the model with MNEs. Results for Norway are in Appendix Figure C.13b.30
Additionally, as Appendix Figure C.12 shows, differences between the two models in-
crease with years of tenure in the market. That is, for exporters that survive at least two
years in a market, by age two, average exports (relative to the year after entry) are only
one percentage point lower in the model with MNEs. But for exporters that survive at
least seven years in a market, the difference between the two models reaches ten percent-
age points by age two and twenty percentage points by age seven.
One remark is in order. In the theory, we showed comparative statics results; that is,
we compared the model with and without exporters for the same set of parameters. We
did not consider the case in which the two models deliver the same share of exporters
which entails to adjust parameters accordingly. This readjustment is what the calibration
does. In the model of Section 4 without sunk costs, it is easy to compute the parameters’
change needed to get the same share of exporters in both models. Simply, one needs to
equate 1 − G(φ̄x
′
) = G(φ̄m) − G(φ̄x), where the productivity cutoffs are given by (7) and
(8), respectively, and the "prime" denotes the equilibrium with only exporters. Given the
values for γ and τ , fx has to be larger in the model without MNEs than in the model with
MNEs to keep the exporters’ share constant. As a consequence, exit rates (to domestic
status) are larger—and growth rates are lower—in the recalibrated model than in the
model without the recalibration because it delivers exporters that are, on average, more
productive.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the calibrated models show more similar growth patterns when
we compare new exporters that eventually become MNEs in the model with MNEs, with
29 Differences would be even more dramatic if averages across export sales were weighed by firm size at
entry.
30 For Norway, differences between the two calibrated models are, on average, less pronounced, but for
some popular destinations, such as Great Britain and France, differences reached almost ten percentage
points (not shown).
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Figure 6: The role of MNEs in new exporters’ dynamics.















































































Notes: Models calibrated to French data. (6a): number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number
of firms active in a mode-market, by mode-market-specific age. (6b): log of firm-destination export sales
with respect to firm-destination export sales in the year after entry, an average over firms with five or more
years in the market. In the data, log of sales are first demeaned by industry, year, and destination fixed
effects.
Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export
firms. Weights are data-based and model-based, for data and model variables, respectively. Exporters in
the data refers to non-MNE exporters only.
exporters in the model without MNEs. The ever-MNE exporters exhibit a sales growth
profile along their life cycle that is steeper than that of new exporters that never change
to MNE status (i.e., the bulk of exporters). We observe this pattern not only for the part
of their life in which they serve the foreign market as exporters, but also for the period
in which they become MNEs, as indicated by the dashed and long-dashed lines, respec-
tively, in Figure 7 (Appendix Figure C.14 reports results for Norway). The sales profiles
for these ever-MNE exporters are closer to those in the model without MNEs (i.e., the
model without "truncation to the right"), particularly for older ages. In the next section,
we provide empirical evidence on this prediction of the model.
The presence of an additional option to serve foreign markets has consequences for the
average productivity of young exporters in the domestic market. For France, a compari-
son of our calibrated models with and without exporters suggests that, while in the entry
year, exporters in the model with MNEs are, on average, three percent more productive—
and almost 20 percent larger—than in the model without MNEs, by age ten, as a conse-
quence of their slower growth rate, they are eight percent less productive—and two thirds
their size. This result implies that, by not including MNEs, dynamic trade models may
be biased in their results regarding the productivity distribution of firms in the domestic
31
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Years from export entry
Model without MNEs, exporters
Model with MNEs, never-MNE exporters (exports)
Model with MNEs, ever-MNE exporters (exports)
Model with MNEs, ever-MNE exporters (exports and MNE sales)
Notes: Models calibrated to French data. Log of firm-destination export (export and MNE) sales with
respect to firm-destination export sales in the year after export entry, an average over firms with five or
more years in the market as exporters. Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted
by each destination’s share of export firms. Weights are model-based. Never-MNE exporters are exporters
that, in our sample period, do not change to MNE status. Ever-MNE exporters are exporters that become
MNEs after export entry. Exports for ever-MNE exporters are computed for the years before MNE entry.
Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters only.
market. The argument is more general, as it can be extended to closed-economy life-cycle
dynamic models. Our quantitative results suggest that adding "truncation-to-the-right"
to the firms’ problem has the potential of changing the quantitative implications of the
closed-economy models.
In conclusion, adding the option of serving foreign markets through FDI slows down
exporters’ growth in a calibrated version of the canonical model of trade. This result is
achieved without resorting to demand-side frictions which, naturally, may complement
our mechanism. Crucially, as we show next, the differences between the two calibrated
models are quantitatively large enough to change the results of some common counter-
factual exercises in the trade literature.
6.1 The effects of trade liberalization
The differences in the life-cycle patterns of exporters between the model with and without
MNEs have important consequences for the life-cycle responses of these groups of firms
to a (permanent) trade-liberalization episode. To evaluate the effects, we perform two
related exercises.
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In our first exercise, we simulate the calibrated models with and without MNEs for an
increase–and a decrease—of 30 percent in iceberg trade costs, τn, for all destinations n.
We then compute the steady-state exit rates and sales profiles, by age, for exporters, in
both models. Figure 8 shows the results using the models calibrated to French moments;
Appendix Figure C.15 shows the results using the models calibrated to the Norwegian
data.
The first result to note is that differences between the two models are larger in an environ-
ment with high iceberg trade costs, as also suggested by the theory. Second, if one were
to move from an environment with high trade costs to one with low trade costs, a model
without MNEs would predict that new exporters have similar life-cycle patterns. In the
model with MNEs, however, new exporters would drastically change their life-cycle pat-
terns: Exit rates by age would be greatly reduced and sales growth greatly increased.
The results in Figure 8 also show the effects of liberalizing MNE activities on exporters’
life-cycle dynamics. In particular, moving from the model without MNEs to the one with
MNEs would imply a small decrease in the exit rates of young exporters but a drastic
decrease in their growth rates: by age five, a 20-percentage-point decrease for an en-
vironment with low trade costs, and an almost 40-percentage-point decrease for an en-
vironment with high trade costs. Relatedly, one can ask how much exporters’ life-cycle
patterns would change if one liberalized only trade or trade and MNEs activities together.
The answer is: for the former case, not much; for the latter, a lot.
Our second exercise compares exporters’ behavior in their first and tenth year of export
activity in the models with and without MNEs, as a function of the export-to-domestic
sales ratio, which, in the model, equals Enτ 1−σn . This exercise is equivalent to computing
exporters’ exit and growth rates, respectively, at age zero and ten, for different values of
variable trade costs, ranging from frictionless trade to high trade cost values. Figure 9
shows the results for France. Results for Norway, which are very similar, are relegated to
Appendix Figure C.16.31
At entry, exporters’ exit rates are very similar across the two models, regardless of the
level of the variable trade costs. In contrast, growth rates are higher in the model without
MNEs, and do not change as much with changes in the trade regime. Ten years after entry,
exit rates are five percentage points higher in the model with MNEs for environments
with high trade costs, while sales, relative to entry, are ten percentage points lower. The
message is similar to the one in Figure 8: In the model with MNEs, moving from autarky
31 Because the transition to MNE status is not very common, the models with and without MNEs deliver
very similar exporters’ participation rates.
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Figure 8: New exporters’ dynamics, high and low iceberg trade costs.
New exporters’ exit rates
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Notes: Models calibrated to French data. Upper panels: number of exits from a mode-market relative to
the number of firms active in a mode-market, by mode-market-specific age. Lower panels: log of firm-
destination export sales with respect to firm-destination export (affiliate) sales in the year after entry, an
average over firms with five or more years in the market.
Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export
firms. Weights are model-based. High, low, and baseline trade costs refer, respectively, to iceberg trade
costs, τn, which are 30 percent higher, 30 percent lower, and equal to the baseline calibrated values, for
each destination n.
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to frictionless trade will drastically change the life-cycle dynamics of young exporters,
while the model without MNEs predicts much smaller changes.
Figure 9: New exporters’ dynamics, comparative statics.
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Notes: Models calibrated to French data. (9a) and (9c): number of exits from a mode-market relative to the
number of firms active in a mode-market, at age zero. (9b) and (9d): log of firm-destination export sales
with respect to firm-destination export sales at age zero, an average over firms with five or more years in
the market.
Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export
firms. Weights are model-based.
Finally, we show a comparison between our calibrated model with exporters and MNEs
and a calibrated model with only MNEs. We recalibrate the parameters of the only-MNE
model in order to match the MNE shares and first-year exit rates observed in the data,
and we compare MNEs’ life-cycle exit and growth rates across the two models. Not sur-
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prisingly, Appendix Figure C.17 shows that, in terms of the dynamic behavior of young
MNEs, there is no difference between the model with exporters and MNEs and the model
without exporters: MNEs are not subject to truncation-to-the-right in either model.32
6.2 Evidence on the dynamics of the proximity-concentration tradeoff
The effects of adding the option of becoming an MNE on exporter sales growth hinges
on the assumption that giving the firms the additional choice of serving foreign markets
through FDI induces truncation to the right of the export productivity distribution. In
this section, we present evidence on the substitution forces between export and MNE
activities that are behind the proximity-concentration tradeoff. While the existence of this
tradeoff has been documented in static setups, as referenced in Footnote 2, there is no
equivalent evidence for dynamic setups.33 We present evidence related to the life-cycle
dynamics of the proximity-concentration tradeoff, which are new to the literature.
The dynamic model of the proximity-concentration tradeoff predicts that exporters that
become MNEs substitute away from exporting and sell to the foreign market by setting up
local production facilities. Using data on life-cycle export and MNE sales, which is avail-
able only for Norway, we explore the behavior of the export-to-foreign affiliate sales ratio
after MNE entry. Figure 10a shows that, on average, firms that enter a market through
FDI reduce export sales from the parent to that market, relative to MNE sales, by almost
15 percentage points. The median MNE shows a reduction in the ratio of export to MNE
sales of more than 25 percentage points. Additionally, as Figure 10b shows, some new
MNEs discontinue exporting altogether: Around ten percent of firms that enter a market
through FDI and were exporting in the period before entry discontinue exporting.34
At the core of the model’s mechanism is the self-selection of fast-growing exporters into
MNE activities. Essentially, the average sales growth rates of exporters in the dynamic
HMY-type model are lower than the average sales growth rates of exporters in a dy-
namic Melitz (2003)-type model because the fastest-growing exporters become MNEs. To
32 Unreported results for Norway are extremely similar.
33 In the aggregate data, trade and multinational activity across country pairs, are positively and strongly
correlated. However, as Head and Ries (2004) notice, in static models, this is not at odds with the presence
of substitution forces. The effect is difficult to disentangle in the aggregate data, mainly due to the presence
of multiple products and vertical production chains. In fact, papers that use detailed firm-level, trade, and
product data do find that FDI substitutes for trade when the cost of trade increases.
34 As mentioned at the beginning of Section 3, more than 30 percent of new MNEs start to export si-
multaneously from the parent to the same market where the affiliate is located. The evidence cited in that
section suggests that this new trade from the parent to the the market where the affiliate operates is related
to production sharing, for the vast majority of firms.
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Figure 10: Substitution between export and MNE activities along the firm’s life cycle.
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Notes: (10a): ratio of exports-to-MNE sales, by years from MNE entry, at the firm-destination level, average over MNE-
destination pairs with at least five years in the market and having exports when they enter MNE status. (10b): export
participation rates of MNEs that export in the year before MNE entry, by years from MNE entry, for firm-destination
pairs that survive at least five years as MNEs in a market.
provide suggestive evidence for this mechanism, we compare export sales growth for ex-
porters that do not choose to become MNEs and for exporters that eventually become
MNEs (for the years before MNE entry). One can think of this second group as mim-
icking the world without the MNE option (i.e., without "truncation to the right" in the
productivity distribution).
Figure 11 shows that, in the French data, the group of exporters that eventually become
MNEs clearly grow faster in terms of exports than the never-MNE exporters. In the Nor-
wegian data, the difference is less marked, but the number of observations decreases
substantially. Appendix Figure C.18 compares growth profiles from the calibrated mod-
els and data, for France, for ever-MNE and never-MNE exporters. As previewed in the
results shown in Figure 7, the model with MNEs almost perfectly matches the growth
profile for new exporters that never switch to MNE status—this is the bulk of exporters
in the data. In contrast, the model without MNEs is closer to the data on exporters that at
some point in their life become MNEs.
The Norwegian data, in addition, allow us to compute the profile of export and MNE
sales lumped together all along the life cycle of a firm since its export entry into a foreign
market. Figure 11b shows that total foreign sales clearly grow faster than only exports,
reminiscent of the result obtained from the calibrated model in Figure 7.
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Years from export entry
Never-MNE exporters (exports)
Ever-MNE exporters (exports)
Ever-MNE exporters (exports and MNE sales)
Notes: Log of firm-destination export (export and MNE) sales with respect to firm-destination export sales in the year
after export entry, for firms with five or more years in the market as exporters. Averages across destinations weighted
by each destination’s share of export firms. Log of sales are first demeaned by industry, year, and destination fixed
effects. Never-MNE exporters are exporters that, in our sample period, do not change to MNE status. Ever-MNE
exporters are exporters that become MNEs after export entry. Exports for ever-MNE exporters are computed for the
years before MNE entry, for exporters that enter MNE status after age four.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the life-cycle dynamics of exporters and multinational enterprises
(MNEs). In particular, we analyze the dynamics of the firm’s choice of serving a foreign
market through exports or through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) —the dynamics of
the proximity-concentration tradeoff. Using the model and new dynamic facts, we quali-
tatively and quantitatively evaluate the effects of including the MNE choice.
We find that including MNEs as an additional way to serve foreign markets slows down
exporters’ growth by 35 percent by age four. More importantly, new exporters’ dynamics
after a trade-liberalization shock are quite different in the dynamic model of the proximity-
concentration tradeoff versus a Melitz-type dynamic model: While in the model with
MNEs, moving from a high to a low trade cost environment would drastically increase
exporters’ sales—and drastically decrease exit rates— by age four, it would barely change
their life-cycle behavior in the model without MNEs.
Our paper shows that omitting from the analysis the different modes of internationaliza-
tion available to the firm, given that they create selection patterns "to-the-right" of the
productivity distribution, may bias the quantitative implications of closed-economy dy-
namic models, as well as of exporter-only dynamic models; enriching the canonical model
38
to include a first-order feature of the data—namely, the MNE option—has consequences
for the predicted behavior of other firms in the economy.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We want to show that the productivity of exporters in the export-only model grows faster
than that of exporters in the model with MNEs. We focus on the geometric average of the
growth rate of exporters’ productivity. Formally, we want to show that
E (zt − zt−1 | zt > z, zt−1 > z) > E (zt − zt−1 | zt > z, zt−1 > z, zt < z̄, zt−1 < z̄) , (A.1)
where the expectation is taken over both zt−1 using the stationary distribution of ex-
porters’ productivity in the two models, respectively, and the shock ǫt, which, in turn,
leads to zt. Note that z̄ < ∞. Let zt = ρzt−1 + σǫǫt, with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Thus, zt − zt−1 =
(ρ−1)zt−1+σǫǫt . Let g(·) denote the density of a normal distribution with mean zero and
standard deviation σǫ, and h(·) the density of a normal distribution with mean zero and
































































































































1−G(z + (1− ρ)z)








G(z̄ + (1− ρ)z)−G(z + (1− ρ)z)
= E(x/z + (1− ρ)z < x < z̄ + (1− ρ)z) =
=
g(c+ µz)− g(c̄+ µz)
G(c̄+ µz)−G(c+ µz)
.
These are means of truncated normals (i.e., the inverse Mills ratio). Rearranging and










































































First, notice that both the right-hand and the left-hand sides are positive since ρ < 1, and
the first terms on both sides refer to truncated functions from below, while the second
terms refer to truncated functions from below and above. If ρ → 1, then the inequality is



























such that for ρ > max(ρ∗, 0), the inequality in (A.6) strictly holds.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Firm-productivity z follows a first-order autoregressive process, z′ = ρz + σǫǫ′ with ǫ′ ∼
N(0, 1) and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Let z̄ denote the exit cutoff and z̄e the entry cutoff into an interna-





Pr(ρx+ σǫǫ ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx
G(c)−G(z̄e − ρa)
denote the probability of exit from status i in t+1 for a firm that is not yet in status i
in t-1 and that has a productivity level of a in t-1. The functions g(·) and G(·) denote,
respectively, the probability and cumulative density functions of a normal distribution
with mean zero and dispersion parameter σǫ.
Let ξ and ϕ be two positive constants, with ξ ≤ ϕ. Without loss of generality, the entry
cutoff is z̄e = z̄+ϕ. We want to show that when we increase the exit cutoff from z̄ to z̄+ ξ,
the exit probability increases more when sunk costs are zero—i.e., ϕ = 0,
f(a; ξ > 0;ϕ = 0)− f(a; ξ = 0;ϕ = 0) > f(a; ξ > 0;ϕ > 0)− f(a; ξ = 0;ϕ > 0).
The first term is given by










Pr(ρx+ σǫǫ ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx
G(c)−G(z̄ − ρa)
, (A.7)
while the second one is




Pr(ρx+ σǫǫ ≤ z̄ + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx





Pr(ρx+ σǫǫ ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx
G(c)−G(z̄ + ϕ− ρa)
. (A.8)
45
Rearranging, we get that
f(a; ξ > 0;ϕ = 0)− f(a; ξ > 0;ϕ > 0) > f(a; ξ = 0;ϕ = 0)− f(a; ξ = 0;ϕ > 0),








Pr(ρx+ σǫǫ ≤ z̄ + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx









Pr(ρx+ σǫǫ ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx
(G(c)−G(z̄ − ρa))(G(c)−G(z̄ + ϕ− ρa))
.

















Pr(ρx+ σǫǫ ≤ z̄ + ξ | x)g(x− ρa)dx,








Pr(ρx+ σǫǫ ≤ z̄ | x)g(x− ρa)dx.
Because Pr(ρx+σǫǫ ≤ z̄+ξ | x) > Pr(ρx+σǫǫ ≤ z̄ | x), we show that when we increase the
exit cutoff, the probability of exit upon entry increases by less with the presence of sunk
costs. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We will prove that if a firm had lower productivity in the period before becoming a multi-
national, it is more likely to exit the year after entry. The proof does not rely on having
sunk MNE costs.
Firm productivity z follows a first-order autoregressive process, z′ = ρz + σǫǫ′ with ǫ′ ∼
N(0, 1) and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Let z̄me and z̄
m be the productivity entry and exit thresholds,
respectively. Let f(a) denote the probability of exit from multinational status in t + 1 for
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Pr(ρx+ σǫǫ ≤ z̄
m | x)g(x− ρa)dx
1−G(z̄me − ρa)
,
where g(·) and G(·) denote, respectively, the probability and cumulative density functions
of a normal distribution with mean zero and dispersion parameter σǫ.
Let ξ → 0, with ξ > 0. We will show that f(.) is a decreasing function—i.e., f(a) − f(a −
ξ) < 0. Replacing, we get that





Pr(ρx+ σǫǫ ≤ z̄









Pr(ρx+ σǫǫ ≤ z̄











Pr(ρx+ σǫǫ ≤ z̄
m | x) [g(x− ρa)(1−G(z̄m
e









Since the denominator is always positive, we need to show that the numerator is negative.













1−G(z̄me − ρa+ ρξ)
= 0.
We then need to show that there exists only one point m ∈ [c,∞] such that for x < m,
g(x− ρa) [1−G(z̄me − ρa+ ρξ)]− g(x− ρa+ ρξ) [1−G(z̄
m
e − ρa)] < 0,
and for x > m,
g(x− ρa) [1−G(z̄me − ρa+ ρξ)]− g(x− ρa+ ρξ) [1−G(z̄
m
e − ρa)] > 0.
Since for ξ > 0 and ξ → 0, G(x− ξ) = G(x)− ξg(x) and g(x− ξ) = g(x)− ξg′(x), replacing,
we get that
g(x− ρa) [1−G(z̄me − ρa+ ρξ)]− g(x− ρa+ ρξ) [1−G(z̄
m
e − ρa)]
= g(x− ρa) [1−G(z̄me − ρa)− ρξg(z̄
m
e − ρa)]− [g(x− ρa) + ρξg
′(x− ρa)] [1−G(z̄me − ρa)]
= −ρξg(x− ρa)g(z̄me − ρa)− ρξg
′(x− ρa) [1−G(z̄me − ρa)]
= ρξg(x− ρa)
{






where, in the last equality, we use that g′(x− ρa) = −g(x− ρa)(x− ρa)/σ2ǫ .
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Denote the function inside the curly brackets in (A.9) as
k(x) ≡ −g(z̄me − ρa) +
x− ρa
σ2ǫ
[1−G(z̄me − ρa)] .




e − ρa)] > 0 (since
[1−G(z̄me − ρa)] and g(z̄
m
e −ρa) are positive constants). It remains to show that for x < m,






which is positive for all x. Thus, k(x) < k(m), for x < m, and k(x) > k(m), for x > m,
which implies that the expression in (A.9) is decreasing, proving that f(a) is a decreasing
function.
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B The dynamic model with export and MNE sunk costs
The model has the same setup as the one in the body of the paper, with the addition of a
one-time sunk cost of opening an affiliate in the foreign market, Fm > 0, as well as a sunk
cost of exporting, F x > 0, with Fm > F x. Both sunk costs are paid in units of labor.
Firms have three possible states: producing in the domestic market for home consumers
only(D); producing in the domestic market for home and foreign consumers (X); or pro-
ducing in the domestic market for home consumers and in the foreign market for foreign
consumers (M ).









− fm + βEV (φ′,M | φ),
Xx(φ)
σ
− fx − F x +βEV (φ′, X | φ), βEV (φ′, D | φ)} . (B.1)
An MNE chooses among continuing its operations abroad; incurring the per-period fixed
cost fm; shutting down the affiliate and becoming an exporter to the foreign market, in-
curring a per-period fixed cost fx and sunk cost F x; or abandoning the foreign market
altogether.








− fm − Fm + βEV (φ′,M | φ),
Xx(φ)
σ
− fx − F x +βEV (φ′, X | φ), βEV (φ′, D | φ)} . (B.2)
A domestic firm can choose to become an MNE in the foreign market and pay the per-
period fixed cost fm and the entry sunk cost Fm; export to the foreign market, and pay the
per-period fixed cost fx and sunk cost F x; or operate in and serve only its home market.








− fm − Fm + βEV (φ′,M | φ),
Xx(φ)
σ
− fx +βEV (φ′, X | φ), βEV (φ′, D | φ)} . (B.3)
An exporter can choose to become an MNE in the foreign market and pay the per-period
fixed cost fm and the entry sunk cost Fm; continue exporting to the foreign market, and
pay the per-period fixed cost fx; or operate in and serve only its home market. The firm
stops being an MNE if choice D or X leads to larger expected discounted profits than
choice M . The optimal exit choice for a multinational is characterized by a cutoff value
of productivity φ̄m. With a productivity level below φ̄m, a current multinational exits
to produce only in the domestic market; with a productivity level above φ̄m, the firm
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remains a multinational. Similarly, there exists an entry cutoff value of productivity, φ̄me ,
such that MNEs with φ ∈ [φ̄m, φ̄me ] keep their multinational status. Exporters face a similar
problem: They will stop being exporters if their productivity drops below φ̄x and will
enter multinational activities if productivity is larger than φ̄me . There exits an entry cutoff
value of productivity, φ̄xe , such that exporters with φ ∈ [φ̄
x, φ̄xe ] keep their exporter status.
These "inaction" zones exist by virtue of the sunk costs of entry into export activities and
MNE activities, respectively.
We assume that φ̄m > φ̄x and check in our calibration that this assumption is satisfied for
the set of calibrated parameters. Notice that this assumption is implicit in the way the
value functions are written: The marginal MNE is indifferent between being an exporter
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95% CI
Notes: Difference in coefficients and 95%-confidence bands from estimating, by OLS,











MNEinta ×D(ageinmt = a) + β3 log home salesimta + ǫinmta,
where D(Exitinmta) is a dummy equal to one in the year t in which firm i of age a exits mode m in market n, and
zero otherwise; MNEinta is one if firm i at age a is active in market n and year t as an MNE, and zero otherwise;
and D(ageinmt = a) equals one if firm i in market n and mode m at time t is of age a, and zero otherwise. We
include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by industry. Exporters are the
base group. Observations are at the firm-destination-year level. Exporters refers to non-MNE exporters only.
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Notes: (C.2a): number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market,
by market-specific age, for exporters and MNEs. (C.2b): number of exits from a market relative to the number
of firms active in a market, by mode-market-specific age, for exporters and MNEs. Averages across destina-
tions weighted by each destination’s share of export (MNE) firms. Exporters refers to non-MNE exporters
only.
Figure C.3: Sales growth rates by age, robustness.
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Notes: (C.3a): log of firm-destination sales relative to firm-destination sales in the year after entry. (C.3b):
log of firm-destination ratio of foreign-to-domestic sales relative to firm-destination ratio in the year after
entry.
Firms with five or more years in the market. Averages across destinations weighted by each destination’s
share of export (MNE) firms. Log of sales (sales ratios) first demeaned by industry, year, and destination
fixed effects. Exporters refers to non-MNE exporters only.
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Mode-market-specific age
Notes: Log of firm-destination export (affiliate) sales with respect to firm-destination export (affiliate) sales in the
year after entry, firms with at least t years in the market, selected cohorts in each mode. Averages across destinations
weighted by each destination’s share of export (MNE) firms. Log of sales first demeaned by industry, year, and
destination fixed effects. Exporters refers to non-MNE exporters only.
Figure C.5: MNEs: Germany, France, and Norway.

























































































Notes: (C.5a): number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, by
mode-market-specific age. (C.5b): log of firm-destination MNE sales with respect to firm-destination MNE sales in
the year after entry, firms with five or more years in the market. Log of sales first demeaned by industry, year, and
destination fixed effects.
Averages across destinations weighted by each destination’s share of MNE firms.
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Figure C.6: Greenfield versus M&A FDI, Germany.

















































































Notes: (C.6a): number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market,
by mode-market-specific age. (C.6b): log of firm-destination MNE sales with respect to firm-destination MNE
sales in the year after entry, firms with five or more years in the market. Averages across destinations weighted
by each destination’s share of MNE firms. Log of sales first demeaned by industry, year, and destination fixed
effects. The sample period is 2005-2011 (no information on FDI entry mode available before 2005).
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Figure C.7: First-year exit rates and market characteristics, Norway.
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Notes: Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, for
exporters and MNEs, in the first year upon market-mode entry (i.e., age zero). Destinations with ten or more
firm-year observations and with available GDP data. Exporters refers to non-MNE exporters only. GDP data
from International Financial Statistics (IMF). Distance data from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago, 2011).
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Figure C.8: First-year exit rates and market characteristics, same set of countries, France.
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Notes: Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, for
exporters and MNEs, in the first year upon market-mode entry (i.e., age zero). Destinations with ten or more
firm-year observations and with available GDP data. Exporters refers to non-MNE exporters only. GDP data
from International Financial Statistics (IMF). Distance data from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago, 2011).
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Mode-market-specific age
95% CI
Notes: Experienced MNEs are new affiliates of MNEs that exported to a foreign market for one or more years before
opening an affiliate there. (C.9a): number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms active in a mode-
market, by mode-market-specific age. (C.9b): difference in coefficients and 95%-confidence bands from estimating, by
OLS,






















D(ageinmt = a)×MNEinta × exp.mneinmta
+β7 log home salesimta + ǫinmta,
(C.1)
where D(Exitinmta) is a dummy equal to one in the year t in which firm i of age a exits mode m in market n, and
zero otherwise; MNEinta is one if firm i at age a is active in market n and year t as an MNE, and zero otherwise; and
D(ageinmt = a) equals one if firm i in market n and mode m at time t is of age a, and zero otherwise. exp.mneinmta
indicates the years of export experience before MNE entry in market n, for firm i at age a and year t. We include
year, industry, and country fixed effects, and robust standard errors. Non-experienced MNEs are the base group.
Observations at the firm-destination-year level.
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Mode-market-specific age
Notes: Models calibrated to French data. Number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number of firms
active in a mode-market, for exporters, for each destination. Rest of the World is a weighted average among the
remaining countries in the sample. Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters only.
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Notes: Models calibrated to French data. Log of firm-destination export sales with respect to firm-destination
export sales in the year after entry, average over firms with five or more years in the market, by destination. Rest
of the World is a weighted average among the remaining countries in the sample. Exporters in the data refers to
non-MNE exporters only.
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Figure C.12: The role of MNEs in new exports’ dynamics, by exporters’ cohort, France.




























































































































































































Notes: Models calibrated to French data. Log of firm-destination export sales with respect to firm-
destination export sales in the year after entry, firms with at least t years in the market as exporters,
selected cohorts. In the data, log of sales first demeaned by industry, year, and destination fixed effects.
Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export
firms. Weights are data-based and model-based, for data and model variables, respectively. Exporters in
the data refers to non-MNE exporters only.
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Figure C.13: The role of MNEs in new exporters’ dynamics.



















































































Notes: Models calibrated to Norwegian data. (C.13a): number of exits from a mode-market relative to the
number of firms active in a mode-market, by mode-market-specific age. (C.13b): log of firm-destination
export sales with respect to firm-destination export sales in the year after entry, firms with five or more
years in the market. In the data, log of sales are first demeaned by industry, year, and destination fixed
effects.
Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export
firms. Weights are data-based and model-based, for data and model variables, respectively. Exporters in
the data refers to non-MNE exporters only.
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Model without MNEs, exporters
Model with MNEs, never-MNE exporters (exports)
Model with MNEs, ever-MNE exporters (exports)
Model with MNEs, ever-MNE exporters (exports and MNE sales)
Notes: Models calibrated to Norwegian data. Log of firm-destination export (export and MNE) sales with
respect to firm-destination export sales in the year after export entry, an average over firms with five or
more years in the market as exporters. Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted
by each destination’s share of export firms. Weights are model-based. Never-MNE exporters are exporters
that, in our sample period, do not change to MNE status. Ever-MNE exporters are exporters that become
MNEs after export entry. Exports for ever-MNE exporters are computed for the years before MNE entry.
Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters only.
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Figure C.15: New exporters’ dynamics, high and low iceberg trade costs.
New exporters’ exit rates


































































New exporters’ sales growth






































































Notes: Models calibrated to Norwegian data. Upper panels: number of exits from a mode-market
relative to the number of firms active in a mode-market, by mode-market-specific age. Lower panels:
log of firm-destination export sales with respect to firm-destination export sales in the year after entry,
firms with five or more years in the market.
Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export
firms. Weights are model-based. High, low, and baseline refer, respectively, to iceberg trade costs,
τn, that are 30 percent higher, 30 percent lower, and equal to the baseline calibrated values, for each
destination n.
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Figure C.16: New exporters’ dynamics, comparative statics.
First year after export entry
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Notes: Models calibrated to Norwegian data. (9a) and (9c): number of exits from a mode-market relative to
the number of firms active in a mode-market, at age zero. (9b) and (9d): log of firm-destination export sales
with respect to firm-destination export sales at age zero, firms with five or more years in the market.
Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export
firms. Weights are model-based.
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Figure C.17: The role of exporters in new MNEs’ dynamics.













































































Notes: Models calibrated to French data. (C.17a): number of exits from a mode-market relative to the number
of firms active in a mode-market, by mode-market-specific age. (C.17b): log of firm-destination MNE sales with
respect to firm-destination MNE sales in the year after entry, firms with five or more years in the market.
Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of MNE firms.
Weights are model-based.
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Notes: Models calibrated to French data. Log of firm-destination export sales with respect to firm-destination
export sales in the year after export entry, an average over firms with five or more years in the market as ex-
porters. Averages across destinations included in the calibration, weighted by each destination’s share of export
firms. Weights are model-based. Never-MNE exporters are exporters that, in our sample period, do not change
to MNE status. Ever-MNE exporters are exporters that become MNEs after export entry. Exports for ever-MNE
exporters are computed for the years before MNE entry. Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters only.
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D Additional tables
Table D.1: Summary statistics.
France
share of revenues share of employment share of firm-year obs firm-year obs
Domestic firms 0.076 0.116 0.697 671,283
Non-MNE exporters 0.289 0.317 0.287 276,499
Non-exporter MNEs 0.005 0.010 0.001 1,007
Exporters MNEs 0.630 0.557 0.015 14,589
Norway
share of revenues share of employment share of firm-year obs firm-year obs
Domestic firms 0.153 0.235 0.622 55,359
Non-MNE exporters 0.625 0.630 0.364 32,376
Non-exporter MNEs 0.002 0.002 0.002 136
Exporter MNEs 0.220 0.133 0.013 1,147
Notes: Non-MNE exporters are exporters that do not have MNE activities. Non-exporter MNEs are MNEs that are
not exporters. Exporter MNEs are MNEs that also export.
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Table D.2: Size at entry and exit.
France Norway
Dep. var.: log of Home sales coefficient standard error coefficient standard error
Transition dummies
domestic to exporter 0.353 0.009 0.032 0.004
domestic to MNE 0.973 0.073 0.337 0.097
exporter to domestic 0.162 0.006 0.025 0.005
exporter to exporter 0.459 0.012 0.022 0.003
exporter to MNE 0.826 0.046 0.148 0.031
MNE to domestic -0.524 0.119 -0.048 0.092
MNE to exporter 0.665 0.042 0.019 0.031
MNE to MNE 0.816 0.053 0.095 0.015
Notes: OLS coefficients from regressing (log of) domestic sales on a dummy for transitioning from status i to
j. The regression includes year and firm fixed effects, and robust standard errors. Observations at the firm-
destination level are 6,885,530 for France and 426,917 for Norway. Exporters refers to non-MNE exporters
only.









Austria 0.003 0.024* Austria 0.009 0.432
Benelux 0.068 0.135* Belgium 0.029 0.086
Switzerland 0.011 0.064 Canada 0.010 0.130
China 0.014 0.213* Germany 0.087 0.456
Germany 0.123 0.181 Denmark 0.030 0.501
Denmark 0.003 0.017* Spain 0.031 0.051
Spain 0.044 0.119 Finland 0.025 0.546
Great Britain 0.040 0.181 France 0.045 0.231
Italy 0.054 0.100 Great Britain 0.069 0.193
Morocco 0.004 0.037 Italy 0.034 0.094
Portugal 0.006 0.019* Netherlands 0.031 0.178
Poland 0.013 0.038 Poland 0.016 0.088
Sweden 0.012 0.037* Sweden 0.065 0.918
Tunisia 0.004 0.008* Singapore 0.018 0.382
United States 0.038 0.427* United States 0.056 0.749
RoW 0.067 0.074 RoW 0.009 0.110
Notes: rx
n
refers to the export-to-domestic sales ratio, while rm
n
refers to the MNE affiliate-to-domestic sales
ratio, for market n. (*) imputed values. RoW refers to the rest of the world, a weighted average among the
remaining countries in the sample.
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Table D.4: Targeted moments, model and data, summary statistics.
Data, avg Model, avg Correlation, data-model
France Norway France Norway France Norway
Share of MNEs 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.70 0.86
Share of exporters 0.090 0.087 0.088 0.086 0.99 0.99
First-year exit rate, exporters 0.462 0.528 0.369 0.380 0.59 0.65
First-year exit rate, MNEs 0.248 0.181 0.248 0.181 0.99 0.99
Notes: Unweighted averages across destination markets included in the calibration. Age zero refers to the entry year.
Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters only.
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Table D.5: Targeted moments, model and data, by country.
Data Model
sh. exporters sh. MNEs first-year exit rates sh. exporters sh. MNEs first-year exit rates
exporters MNEs exporters MNEs
France
Austria 0.054 0.001 0.462 0.258 0.054 0.001 0.388 0.257
Benelux 0.158 0.004 0.339 0.299 0.158 0.004 0.338 0.299
Switzerland 0.133 0.003 0.501 0.223 0.131 0.003 0.356 0.223
China 0.036 0.003 0.521 0.188 0.036 0.003 0.387 0.188
Germany 0.128 0.005 0.418 0.250 0.127 0.005 0.351 0.249
Denmark 0.050 0.001 0.452 0.195 0.050 0.001 0.390 0.195
Spain 0.118 0.005 0.416 0.249 0.117 0.005 0.354 0.249
Great Britain 0.105 0.004 0.429 0.297 0.104 0.004 0.359 0.296
Italy 0.111 0.004 0.438 0.295 0.110 0.004 0.358 0.296
Morocco 0.057 0.002 0.543 0.218 0.056 0.002 0.381 0.218
Poland 0.051 0.003 0.455 0.223 0.051 0.003 0.379 0.223
Portugal 0.070 0.002 0.455 0.235 0.069 0.002 0.376 0.235
Sweden 0.049 0.001 0.445 0.235 0.049 0.001 0.390 0.236
Tunisia 0.052 0.001 0.529 0.298 0.051 0.001 0.389 0.297
United States 0.078 0.006 0.511 0.238 0.077 0.006 0.360 0.237
RoW 0.194 0.008 0.488 0.273 0.191 0.008 0.334 0.273
Norway
Austria 0.031 0.001 0.527 0.263 0.031 0.0010 0.405 0.262
Belgium 0.055 0.001 0.552 0.214 0.054 0.0010 0.392 0.214
Canada 0.039 0.001 0.549 0.222 0.039 0.0010 0.400 0.222
Germany 0.135 0.004 0.541 0.182 0.132 0.0040 0.356 0.182
Denmark 0.193 0.004 0.511 0.163 0.188 0.0040 0.344 0.164
Spain 0.060 0.001 0.533 0.059 0.065 0.0010 0.388 0.058
Finland 0.099 0.002 0.544 0.192 0.097 0.0020 0.371 0.192
France 0.073 0.003 0.524 0.310 0.072 0.0030 0.375 0.310
Great Britain 0.123 0.006 0.506 0.179 0.121 0.0060 0.354 0.179
Italy 0.062 0.002 0.553 0.154 0.063 0.0020 0.383 0.157
Netherlands 0.100 0.002 0.528 0.238 0.098 0.0020 0.370 0.239
Poland 0.055 0.002 0.504 0.071 0.054 0.0020 0.389 0.072
Sweden 0.249 0.007 0.484 0.158 0.242 0.0070 0.329 0.158
Singapore 0.035 0.002 0.505 0.150 0.035 0.0020 0.398 0.151
United States 0.077 0.004 0.519 0.130 0.076 0.0040 0.372 0.130
RoW 0.005 0.0001 0.572 0.204 0.005 0.0001 0.458 0.205
Notes: First-year exit rate refers to exit at age zero. RoW refers to the rest of the world, a weighted average among the
remaining countries in the sample. Exporters in the data refers to non-MNE exporters only.
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Table D.6: Calibrated parameters, by country.

















Austria 0.02 3.09 4.55E-05 1.77 0.02 1.66E-06 3.50 1.97
Benelux 0.14 4.25 2.91E-05 1.48 0.15 1.16E-04 8.29 2.94
Switzerland 0.03 3.82 1.53E-06 2.46 0.03 1.08E-06 4.55 2.94
China 0.14 13.9 4.88E-05 11.21 0.16 1.07E-06 14.8 11.98
Germany 0.32 3.28 2.89E-05 1.50 0.34 3.48E-04 9.25 4.61
Denmark 0.02 1.97 1.24E-06 1.66 0.02 4.40E-05 2.36 2.03
Spain 0.13 3.95 9.14E-05 1.96 0.14 2.10E-05 6.06 3.09
Great Britain 0.14 8.80 2.80E-06 3.22 0.14 3.69E-04 11.1 4.11
Italy 0.17 3.00 3.45E-05 1.03 0.18 1.30E-05 6.12 2.25
Morocco 0.03 3.08 1.13E-05 2.14 0.03 3.64E-05 3.41 2.35
Portugal 0.03 1.25 6.75E-06 0.75 0.03 4.84E-06 1.78 1.10
Poland 0.10 1.88 2.36E-04 1.14 0.10 2.24E-05 2.69 1.76
Sweden 0.10 3.68 1.15E-06 2.37 0.10 1.12E-05 5.30 3.47
Tunisia 0.04 0.66 1.10E-03 0.28 0.03 1.49E-05 1.19 0.53
United States 0.18 17.6 3.24E-04 9.38 0.19 8.20E-05 19.0 10.30
RoW 0.10 0.36 4.61E-05 0.10 0.11 3.42E-05 2.71 1.07
Norway
Austria 0.03 6.80 1.02E-05 2.57 0.03 1.62E-05 6.88 2.63
Belgium 0.09 0.99 8.62E-03 0.55 0.07 1.01E-06 1.33 0.69
Canada 0.03 1.90 1.00E-06 0.92 0.03 8.35E-06 2.03 1.00
Germany 0.10 3.27 6.14E-05 1.78 0.10 1.28E-04 3.91 2.17
Denmark 0.02 4.04 2.50E-06 2.53 0.03 1.02E-06 4.25 2.66
Spain 0.06 0.33 2.01E-04 0.40 0.07 3.03E-05 0.68 1.02
Finland 0.04 6.09 1.72E-06 3.36 0.04 1.37E-06 6.34 3.56
France 0.08 2.02 1.40E-05 0.47 0.08 5.95E-05 2.39 0.58
Great Britain 0.09 0.97 6.00E-04 0.48 0.09 2.22E-05 1.37 0.75
Italy 0.07 0.76 1.83E-04 0.50 0.07 4.24E-05 1.07 0.75
Netherlands 0.05 1.80 2.91E-05 0.74 0.05 3.21E-06 2.12 0.89
Poland 0.04 0.79 2.35E-05 0.99 0.04 7.54E-06 0.92 1.18
RoW 0.08 3.66 5.11E-05 2.33 0.04 2.83E-06 3.90 2.52
Sweden 0.04 5.65 1.03E-06 3.48 0.06 1.03E-06 6.02 3.69
Singapore 0.05 4.18 1.43E-06 3.01 0.10 3.31E-04 4.31 3.12
United States 0.10 5.87 1.41E-05 4.54 0.08 5.38E-05 6.21 4.85
Notes: fx
n
are per-period fixed export costs; fm
n
are per-period fixed MNE costs; F x
n
are sunk export costs; and Fm
n
are sunk MNE costs. RoW refers to the rest of the world, a weighted average among the remaining countries in the
sample.
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Table D.7: The size of calibrated costs, by country.

















Austria 12.99 12.64 0.027 7.24 3,372 n.a. 7.0 n.a.
Benelux 10.85 7.35 0.002 2.57 12,530 n.a. 2.6 n.a.
Switzerland 11.25 11.50 0.001 7.42 3,338 n.a. 0.2 n.a.
China 14.21 12.64 0.005 10.16 6,563 n.a. 2.2 n.a.
Germany 11.46 4.91 0.001 2.25 13,020 n.a. 1.2 n.a.
Denmark 13.16 11.36 0.001 9.58 3,318 n.a. 0.2 n.a.
Spain 11.76 9.00 0.008 4.46 9,591 n.a. 6.8 n.a.
Great Britain 11.95 11.28 0.000 4.13 9,984 n.a. 0.2 n.a.
Italy 11.80 6.96 0.002 2.38 8,850 n.a. 1.8 n.a.
Morocco 13.06 12.44 0.005 8.63 3,729 n.a. 1.6 n.a.
Portugal 12.61 9.79 0.003 5.90 3,731 n.a. 0.8 n.a.
Poland 13.46 9.55 0.033 5.80 5,889 n.a. 14 n.a.
Sweden 13.16 9.76 0.000 6.29 4,228 n.a. 0.1 n.a.
Tunisia 13.65 7.86 0.323 3.35 4,390 n.a. 104 n.a.
United States 12.83 12.59 0.024 6.71 6,471 n.a. 12 n.a.
RoW 10.42 1.81 0.005 0.52 7,975 n.a. 3.7 n.a.
Norway
Austria 16.99 16.85 0.00 6.40 5,356 1,466,707 0.44 556,550
Belgium 11.60 11.58 0.01 5.55 3,981 295,513 4.59 141,719
Canada 16.73 15.71 0.00 7.59 4,996 1,132,263 1.06 546,922
Germany 14.88 13.57 0.00 7.28 6,153 1,079,257 0.35 579,026
Denmark 13.97 15.19 0.00 9.54 3,788 1,626,206 0.15 1,021,119
Spain 27.64 8.06 5.26 8.23 13,242 153,706 2,522 156,870
Finland 15.37 15.76 0.00 8.67 5,409 1,280,906 1.07 704,948
France 16.04 14.54 0.00 3.38 7,772 750,075 0.11 174,448
Great Britain 14.80 11.36 0.00 5.72 7,948 604,086 1.44 304,151
Italy 15.02 11.15 0.02 6.95 7,344 770,015 10.1 479,670
Netherlands 15.39 14.29 0.00 5.85 6,580 1,038,968 0.47 425,271
Poland 16.47 12.73 0.00 15.65 7,510 462,444 0.48 568,523
Sweden 12.50 17.92 0.00 12.86 4,959 1,264,241 0.22 907,372
Singapore 31.28 15.52 0.00 11.97 14,440 1,646,378 0.85 1,269,826
United States 24.98 13.58 0.02 8.58 12,918 1,818,547 11.1 1,149,656
RoW 6.82 14.27 0.00 8.80 1,672 938,725 0.09 578,789
Notes: fx
n
are per-period fixed export costs; fm
n
are per-period fixed MNE costs; F x
n
are sunk export costs;
and Fm
n
are sunk MNE costs. Median firm refers to the firm with median export (MNE) sales in destination
n. RoW refers to the rest of the world, a weighted average among the remaining countries in the sample.
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